Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Dawn W. Horne v. W. Reid Horne : Petition for
Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard K. Crandall, Rodney R. Parker; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; attorneys for appellant.
Robert J. Poulsen, Bradley R. Jones, David A. Wilde; Braunberger, Poulsen & Boud; attorneys for
plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Dawn W. Horne v. W. Reid Horne, No. 870260.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1683

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

$70Z£>O
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAWN W. HORNE,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

P l a i n t i f f-Reoponde~TTt,
vs.
W. REID HORNE,

Case No.

tftJOP^O

Def endant-Ap-pellaflt,
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM A DECISION AND JUDGMENT
OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Robert J. Poulsen, USB #A2633
Bradley R. Jones, USB #A4747
David A. Wilde, USB #A4695
BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone Number: (80D-263-0300

Richard K. Crandall
Rodney R. Parker
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Appellant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone Number: (801 )-521-9000

FILED
"H. 2 31987
Clerk, Supreme Court. Utah

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATORY STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

Course of Proceedings

2

Facts

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I
7
THE ENTRY OF A NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER IS A DISCRETIONARY MATTER WHICH SHOULD NOT BE OVER BE OVERTURNED
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
THERE WAS NO CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THIS
MATTER.
POINT II

12

JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED JUNE 20, 1984. THE NUNC PRO
TUNC ORDER TO JUNE 20 1984 WAS THEREFORE PROPER IN
THAT IT ONLY MADE THE RECORD SPEAK THE TRUTH.
POINT III

14

THERE WAS NO "PACKAGE DEAL" WHEREBY PLAINTIFF'S
ORIGINAL COUNSEL WAS RELIEVED FROM MISCONDUCT
CHARGES IN RETURN FOR ENTRY OF THE ORDER NUNC
PRO TUNC.
POINT IV

15

IF THE COURT FINDS THAT ENTRY OF THE NUNC PRO
TUNC ORDER WAS ERROR, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED
TO THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUNDS THAT (1) DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED PLAINTIFF
INTO A STIPULATION WHICH WOULD NEGATIVELY AFFECT
HER, OR (2) THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHEN THE ORAL STIPULATION WAS
ENTERED INTO.
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Anderson v. National Carriers, Inc., 727 P.2d 899, 904
(Kan. 1986)

8

Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976) . .

8

First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundell, 600 P.2d
521, 527 (Utah 1979)

15

Jones v. Gladney, 339 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Alabama 1976) . .

13

Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976)

8,

Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984)

7

Runyon v. City of Neosho Rapids, 585 P.2d 1069, 1071
(Kan. App. 1978)

15

State v. Anderson, 702 P.2d 481, 492 (Wash. App. 1985). .

8

United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)

5,

United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 757 (10th
Cir. 1980)
Willmon v. State Ex Rel. Eyman, 493 P.2d 125, 126

15

(Ariz. 1972)

13
Statutes

Utah Code Annotated § 30-4a-l (Supp. 1983)

2,

Rules of Practice in the District Court and
the Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, Rule 4.5(b). . .

2,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAWN W. HORNE,
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vs.
W. REID HORNE,

)
)
)

PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

)

Case No.

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

In an action for divorce, where property

settlement provisions are stipulated to, does the court
abuse its discretion in issuing an order nunc pro tunc when
the court has found that tax law changes would deprive a
party of benefits under the stipulation which that party
would otherwise have received.
2.

Should a stipulation be set aside when it

appears the parties had no "meeting of the minds", or
where it appears that one party was fraudulently induced
to enter into the stipulation.
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff petitions this court for review by a
Writ of Certiorari of the judgment of the Utah Court of
Appeals.

The court reversed the decision of Third District

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup who granted a nunc pro tunc order as

to property settlement provisions of a divorce decree.
(Home v. H o m e , 860060-CA [Utah Ct. App. May 18, 1987]).
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review the opinion of the Court of
Appeals entered in this matter May 18, 1987, (Petition for
Rehearing denied June 23, 1987) is vested in the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, Section 4;
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) (1987); and R. Utah S. Ct.
42, 43 and 45.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(1) Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l (Supp. 1983):
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction
may, upon its finding of good cause and giving ot
such notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc
Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce,
legal separation or annulment of marriage.
(2)

Rules of Practice in the District Courts and

Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, Rule 4.5(b):
Stipulations. No orders, judgments or decrees
upon stipulation shall be signed or entered unless
such stipulation is in writing, signed by the
attorneys of record for the respective parties
and filed with the clerk, provided that the
stipulation may be made orally in open court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff instituted her divorce action on
February 19, 1980.

The trial court bifurcated the proceedings,

entering an order ot divorce on January 27, 1984 but reserving
-2-
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Facts
Plaintiff, Dawn w. Home, and Defendant, W. Reid
H o m e , were married on January 17, 1970. Plaintiff and
Defendant each brought substantial premarital assets into
the marriage.

In addition, the parties accumulated substantial

property during the marriage.

Plaintiff filed for divorce

on February 19, 1980. Trial of the property aspect of the
case commenced June 19, 1984.

During the second day of

trial the parties reached agreement on the property aspects
of their divorce which was read into the record in open court
on the afternoon of June 20, 1984.

Each of the parties and

their respective counsel were present on this occasion. At
the time this stipulation was read into the records of the
court, Plaintiff's counsel made the comment that property
"...will be transferred to (Plaintiff) as an exchange item
to equalize the marital assets of the parties in this
matter."

(Transcript of June 20, 1984 hearing, page 3.)

After listening to the terms of the stipulation, the court
asked each party if they were in agreement therewith.

Each

party responded affirmatively, whereupon the court
stated "I will approve the stipulation..."

(Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff's attorney then proceeded to prepare
a written stipulation and order to be signed by the trial
-4-

court.

Upon submission to Detendant1s attorney, the

documents which had been drafted by Plaintiff's attorney
were rejected. Defendant's attorney argued that the written
agreement did not properly state the tax consequences of the
agreements entered into by the parties on June 20, 1984.
Counsel were thereafter unable to agree on the terms which
should be contained in the written stipulation.

A hearing

was therefore scheduled before the court on August 8, 1984,
wherein counsel were given opportunity to argue their
respective positions on this dispute.
Defendant's attorney argued that the stipulation
entered into on June 20

1984 was intended to give Detendant

tax benefits under the rules stated in United States v.
Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) and subsequent revenue rulings by
the IRS.

(Transcript of August 8 f 1984 hearing, pages

23-25,56-58.)

This argument was based solely on the fact

that Plaintiff's attorney had stated that property was being
transferred "as an exchange item to equalize marital assets".
Plaintiff's attorney argued that no such intent existed on
June 20, 1984.

He argued that Plaintiff would never have

entered into such an agreement as it would involve negative
tax consequences to Plaintiff.

(Rl. at 16, 18, 37, 40-41,

55 and 61.)
The court, after listening to the arguments of
-5-

counsel, held that the June 20, 1984 stipulation was not
intended to confer tax benefits on Defendant.
65»)

(Ld. at

The court stated its belief that Plaintiff's use of

the quoted language was not intended as a "term of art".
(Id. at 66.)

The court further noted that neither party

specifically discussed tax concerns on June 20, such as
stepped-up basis, carry-over basis, etc.
Finally, the court ruled that it

(I_d. at 67.)

would issue an order nunc

pro tunc to June 20, 1984, which would contain no reterence
to tax consequences of the property split between the
parties. (Id.

at 65.) The court's determination to enter its

order nunc pro tunc was based on a recent change in the tax
law which would prejudice Plaintiff if the order were not
issued nunc pro tunc.

(Id. at 64.)

The nunc pro tunc order

was signed by the lower court on August 17, 1984.

Defendant

filed his notice of appeal on September 12, 1984.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The entry of a nunc pro tunc order is a

discretionary matter which should not be overturned in the
absence of any clear abuse of discretion.

There is no clear

abuse of discretion in this case.
2.

Because an oral agreement was entered into

in open court on June 20, 1984, and approved by the court,
judgment was rendered at such time.
-6-

The court's determination

to enter its order nunc pro tunc therefore only made the
record speak the truth*
3.

There was no exchange whereby Plaintiff

dropped charges against her original attorney in return for
entry of the order nunc pro tunc*
4.

Plaintiff should not be bound to a stipulation

which was entered into fraudulently or under mistake of
fact or law,
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ENTRY OF A NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER IS A DISCRETIONARY MATTER
WHICH SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CLEAR
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THERE WAS NO CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN THIS MATTER.
The entry of an order nunc pro tunc is a matter
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and one
which should therefore not be interfered with lightly.
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion in the case ot
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984), indicated
that Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l, authorizing the issuance
of orders nunc pro tunc, "commits broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic
relations matters."

It should be noted that though this was

a dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart, the above statement
was not contrary to the opinion of the majority, which held
as it did for other reasons.
A decision committed to the discretion of the
-7-

trial court is not to be tampered with on appeal unless
a clear abuse of discretion is shown.

In Peatross v.

Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281,
284 (Utah 1976), the court said:
•..Ordinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting
within the scope of its authority, has conducted a
hearing and arrived at a decision, the reviewing
court...will not interfere with matters of
discretion or upset the actions of the lower
tribunal, except upon a showing that the tribunal
acted in excess of its authority or in a manner
so clearly outside reason that its action must be
deemed capricious and arbitrary.
Likewise, in Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286,
1290 (Utah 1976), the court held: "The judgment of the trial
court will not be reversed unless it is shown that the
discretion exercised therein has been abused."
In determining whether a "clear abuse of discretion"
has occurred, the relevant question is not what the appeals
court might have done had they been in the position of
the trial court.

Rather, the question which must be answered

is whether or not the trial court acted reasonably.

As

stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Peatross, supra, did
the trial court act ".. in a manner so clearly outside
reason that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary."
(See also Anderson v. National Carriers, Inc., 727 P.2d 899,
904 (Kan. 1986), and State v. Anderson, 702 P.2d 481,
492 (Wash. App. 1985).

These cases define an abuse of

discretion to exist "...only when no reasonable person would
-8-

take the position adopted by the trial court.")
Given the above points of law, the only issue
this court must determine is whether or not it can be
said that the decision of the trial court to grant an order
nunc pro tunc was within the realm of reasonability.
If the decision was reasonable, then there was no abuse
of discretion and no basis on which to reverse such decision.
The trial court determined that good cause existed
to enter its order nunc pro tunc.

This finding was based

on the fact that the oral stipulation of the parties had
been entered into on June 20, 1984.

On July 18, 1984—after

the stipulation had been entered into, but before a final
order had been prepared and signed by the Judge—Congress
changed the tax law in such a way that Plaintiff would
be required to receive the property to be given to her under
the property stipulation with a carry-over basis, and, thus,
suffer negative tax consequences which would not have
been present on June 20, 1984.

On the basis of these

Tax law prior to July 18, 1984 generally allowed a
party conveyed property as part of a divorce settlement
to receive such property with a stepped-up basis.
Conversely, the party conveying such property was
taxed for such conveyance on the theory that it was akin
to a sale or transfer. This general rule was based
on the case of U.S. v. Davis, supra. Subsequent revenue
rulings by the IRS granted exceptions to the Davis
rule if a transfer of property to a spouse was a bona
fide effort to make the marital assets of the parties
approximately equal.
-9-

facts, the trial court found good cause to enter its
order nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984.

In essence, the court

felt that it would be unfair to subject Plaintiff to the
negative tax consequences imposed by the July 18, 1984 Act
of Congress, when this act was not in existence on the date
the oral stipulation was entered into.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in granting the order nunc pro tunc
in this matter.

Defendant argues that the stipulation

entered into on June 20 specifically contemplated that
Plaintiff would receive her share of the property split
with a carry-over basis.

This argument is based on the

fact that the stipulation of June 20 contained language
stating that the property given to Plaintiff would be
as an "exchange item to equalize marital assets". This
language, Defendant contends, is a term of art requiring
that Plaintiff receive the property with a carry-over
basis.

(Transcript of August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 23-25,

56-58.)
The trial court rejected Defendant's arguments
on these points.

The trial court specifically stated

its position that the quoted language at the June 20 nearing
had not been "intended as a term of art".

(Id_. at 66.) In

support of its position, the court noted that at the June 20
-10-

hearing, there had been "no discussion on the record with
regard to basis or stepped-up basis or any specific discussions
on the record with respect to tax consequences."
67.)

(Ici. at

Accordingly, the court found that the stipulaton of

June 20, 1984 had not been entered with intent that Plaintiff
receive property with a carry-over basis. (IcL at 65.)
Thus, it would not frustrate the intent of the parties to
enter a nunc pro tunc order.

Rather, a nunc pro tunc order

would properly effectuate the intent of the parties.
The rulings of the trial court in the above
particulars were reasonable. It is reasonable to consider
the fact, as the trial court did, that there was no explicit
discussion whatsoever of tax consequences at the time the
oral stipulation was read into the record.

The trial court

was not unreasonable in concluding that parties who intended
tax consequences under the exception to the Davis rule would
make such intent clear.

It is not unreasonable, indeed it

should usually be expected, that parties who contemplate
tax benefits under the exception to the Davis rule will be
very careful and explicit in stating such intent both orally
in court and in written documents submitted to the court.
The fact that Defendant's attorney was so insistent upon
explicit language in the written stipulation to be submitted
to the court is evidence of the reasonableness of this
-11-

conclusion.

(Further evidence of the reasonableness of the

trial court's ruling can be found in the transcript of the
August 8, 1984 hearing at pages 23, 25-26, 36, 38, 57, 65
and 67.

The arguments contained on these pages are

reasonable and support the contention that the Judge's
determination was reasonable.)
It simply cannot be said that the court acted
"clearly outside reason" in this matter. The conclusions
reached by the trial court were reasonable. The court
articulated reasonable basis to support its conclusions.
Being within the realm of reasonability, there has been no
abuse of discretion, and no basis on which to overturn the
decision of the trial court.
II
JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED JUNE 20, 1984. THE NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER
TO JUNE 20, 1984 WAS THEREFORE PROPER IN THAT IT ONLY MADE
THE RECORD SPEAK THE TRUTH.
Rule 4.5(b) of the Rules of Practice in the
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah
provides that "...orders, judgments or decrees upon stipulation
shall (not) be signed or entered unless such stipulation is
in writing...provided that the stipulation may be made
orally in open court."

(Emphasis added.)

The implication

of the latter clause of this rule is that a judgment or
decree may be entered based on a stipulation made orally in
open court and approved by the court.
-12-
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THERE WAS NO "PACKAGE DEAL" WHEREBY PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL
COUNSEL WAS RELIEVED FROM MISCONDUCT CHARGES IN RETURN FOR
ENTRY OF THE ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC.
At page

8 of the opinion of the Court of Appeals

dated May 18, 1987, the court states "...a fair reading of
the record indicates that in reaching its decision, the
court improperly considered Plaintiff's offer to drop the
misconduct charges against her counsel in return for entry
of the order nunc pro tunc."

Careful review of the entire

record does not substantiate this conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals.
Though Plaintiff did allege misconduct on the part
of her original counsel, there was no bargain struck
whereby Plaintiff agreed to dismiss such allegations in
return for the entry of the order nunc pro tunc.

The record

shows quite clearly that Plaintiff had become dissatisfied
with her original counsel and sought to obtain new counsel
to represent her in further proceedings.
August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 16-20.)

(Transcript of

The case had proceeded

to such a point where it was not possible for Plaintiff to
simply dismiss her original counsel and retain new counsel.
She therefore alleged misconduct in order that her
wish to obtain new counsel might be enforced.
17-20.)

(I_d. at

However, when the trial court announced its intention

to enter an order nunc pro tunc, it was apparent that
Plaintiff had no further need tor representation of counsel,
-14-
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IF THE COURT FINDS THAT ENTRY OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER
WAS ERROR, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT ON
THE GROUNDS THAT (1) DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL FRAUDULENTLY
INDUCED PLAINTIFF INTO A STIPULATION WHICH WOULD NEGATIVELY
AFFECT HER, OR (2 ) THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN
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manifest injustice."

The court then quoted earlier cases

stating that stipulations may not be enforced if there
is a finding that a party's assent thereto was not "informed
and voluntary".
Defendant's attorney has admitted that there
was no meeting of the minds between the parties when this
stipulation was entered into.

At the hearing before the

Court of Appeals on April 29, 1987, Defendant's attorney
made several significant admissions regarding this "meeting
of the minds" issue.

There is no transcript of this hearing,

but references to the revolution number on the tape recording
of this hearing will be given.
At revolution 1078 on the tape recording of
the hearing before the Court of Appeals, Defendant's attorney
made the following comment: "To be quite frank, I don't
think until they (Plaintiff and her attorney) got into it
(the terms of the stipulation) that they realized what the
tax impact (was) until the deal was done."

Later, at

revolution 1405, the following dialogue takes place between
the court and Defendant's attorney:
Court:

"You never approved the written order?"

(Referring to the written order prepared by Plaintiff's
attorney after the stipulation had been entered into in
open court.)
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-
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read

:

. •-. iru>.,i.
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language.

Surely, if Plaintiff's attorney had been informed

as to the significance of the language on June 20, 1984, the
issue would have come to a head at that point, rather than
later when the written stipulation was being prepared.
Inducing Plaintiff's counsel to include certain tax language
in the oral stipulation without informing him of the significance of the language was fraudulent behavior on the part of
Defendant's attorney.
Plaintiff substantiates the statements of Defendant's
attorney to the effect that there was no meeting of the
minds.

Plaintiff, who represented herself at the hearing

before the Court of Appeals, discussed the negative tax
consequences imposed upon her if the court were to accept
Defendant's argument.

She then states "I never would

have accepted the apartments under those conditions."
(See again transcript of August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 16,
18, 37, 40-41, 55 and 61.)
It is apparent that there was no meeting of the
minds between either the parties or their counsel when
the stipulation read into the record on June 20, 1984 was
entered into.

It appears also that there may even be a

degree of fraud on the part of Defendant and his attorney in
regards to the June 20 stipulation.

Plaintiff should not be

bound to the stipulation under those circumstances.
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::^re

of a nunc pro tunc order by the trial court was an abuse of
discretion, and that there was no reasonable basis on
which to enter such order, this court should remand the
entire property distribution issue to the trial court
on the grounds that there was no meeting of the minds
between the parties when the oral stipulation was entered
into, and/or Defendant and his attorney fraudulently induced
Plaintiff and her attorney to enter into the oral stipulation
on June 20, 1984.
DATED this 2 3

day of July, 1987.
BRAUN££RGER, POUI^SEN & BOUD, P.C.

Robert J. (Poulsen
Bradley R. Jones
David A. Wilde

7/11/87,a6-30,le
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1984; 10:00 A,

2

-ooOoo-

3 [

[The Court, having conferred with counsel

4

and parties off the record, and negotiations having tak(

5 I

place, the following proceedings were held in chambers

6

with counsel and parties present at 3:12

J

p.m.]

7

8 I
9

THE COURT:

The attorneys have advised the

Court that they have settled the outstanding issue in

10

this case; is that correct?

11

MR. LIAPIS:

12

THE COURT:

13 I

MR. CRANDALL:

14

That's correct, your Honor.
Is that right, Mr. Crandail?
Yes, I hope so.

I think

we've got it all agreed to,

15 I
16 J

THE COURT:

is on the record, Mr. Liapis?

17

MR. LIAPIS:

18

|

19

I

20

I

Yes, I would•

Let me just

locate the checklist here,
THE COURT:

Plaintiff may have a divorce,

final on entry.

21 |
22

Will you state what the agreem

MR. LIAPIS:

That has already been entered,

your Honor.

23 |
24

J

25

I

THE COURT:

That's right.

I can't do that.

She got one in advance,
MR. LIAPIS:

With regard to the properties,

1

the plaintiff, Mrs. Home , will be awarded the

2

condominium which she's now residing in, the duplexes

—

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LIAPIS:

Well, I knew you were going to

6

MRS. HORNE:

691 East 4181 South.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. LIAPIS:

9

1700 South and 1933-37 East 1700 South.

Where at?

ask that.

5

Okay.
The two duplexes at 1925-27 East
That's free and

j

10

clear of any interest of 1bhe defendant, and subject to

11

plaintiff assuming and paying the mortgage payments thereon
THE COURT:

12

mortgage payments?

13
14

!

Plaintiff to assume and pay

Is that what you said?

MR. LIAPIS: Yes.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LIAPIS:

All right,

1

In addition, the plaintiff will

17

be awarded all right, title and interest in and to the

18

Townhouse Court apartment complex, together with all of the

19

appliances.

Is there any furniture in it?

20

MR. HORNE:

21

MR. LIAPIS:

I

No.

j

Appliances, deposits, rentals, j

22

the whole thing.

23

exchange item to equalize the marital assets of the parties

24

in this matter.

25

|

It will be transferred to her as an

MR. HORNE: Could I make one point?

Could
i

i

Ll

1 l

we have a cutoff point as of the first of the mont

2

I

MR. LIAPIS:

3

|

MR. HORNE:

It's the 20th.

MR. LIAPIS:

That's fine.

4

? j
6

the first of July.

I

7

What is today?

Commencinc

Is that all right?

MRS. HORNE:

That's fine.

MR. LIAPIS:

Plaintiff will assume tt

8

mortgage payment thereon, taxes commencing with the

9

of July through the end of the year.

10

I

11

MR. HORNE:

The reserve account is se

at Prudential.

12

i

13

I

MR. LIAPIS:
will be transferred.

14

MR. HORNE:

15

MR. LIAPIS:

16

The reserve account like

That will go with it.
All right.

And there is

shortage in that reserve account?

17

MR. HORNE:

18

No, there's $333 at the f

of the year that was left over, so

19

MR. LIAPIS:

—

And there have been payro<

20

|

21

I

22

'

23

|

24

I

be awarded the vacant lot at 6716 13th East as her s

25

'

and separate property, free and clear of any interes

made?
MR. HORNE:

It's been made every montt

There should be an overage, not an underage,
MR. LIAPIS:

In addition, the plaintii

1 :

the defendant.

2
3

Defendant will be awarded, by way of
properties —

let me start at the front.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LIAPIS:

Awarded all other real property?
All the rest, which would

6

include, for the Court's notes, the Suzie-Q Apartments,

7

the Elm Avenue five-plex, the Townhouse Villa complex,

8

the Townhouse II complex, the office and warehouse complex,

9

the Edison property, Snowbird Iron Blosam time share, and

10

lot 76 of Bloomington Country Club.

11

Plaintiff will be awarded all right, title

12

and interest in and to the balloon payment that's part of

13

the sale of the 4400 South State Street property, including

14

the monthly payments.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LIAPIS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. LIAPIS:

1

9

interest, I think it was.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. LIAPIS:

Of how much?
$160,000 is the principal sum.
Due when?
With eleven and a half per cent
Due November of 1983.
And what's the property?
4400 South State Street.

22

that would include the payment of the regular monthly

23

payments on that balloon of $2,000 a month.

24
25

THE COURT:
interest?

And

She's just awarded the seller f s

1

MR. HORNE:

2

MR. LIAPIS:

That's right.
That's correct.

And he is

3

awarded, in a<ddition, the Honeywood Condominiums at -

4

two Honeywood Condominiums.

5

The defendant will pay to plaintiff the

6

sum of $5,000 today, $15,000 cash in ten days, and an

7

additional $5 ,000.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LIAPIS:

10

cash in six months.

11

$5,000 today and $15,000 whe
Ten days from today.

$5,0C

Okay.

The June support payment will be conside

12

paid with the transfer of the $5,000 today.

13

will maintain the plaintiff as an owner with the defen

14

paying the premium on a $100,000 term life insurance

15

policy, a reasonable rate policy.

16
17

THE COURT:

Defendant will maintain a

$100,000 life insurance policy?

18

MR. LIAPIS:

With plaintiff to have

19

ownership, plaintiff beneficiary.

20

premium.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. LIAPIS:

23

The defen

of the policy

Defendant pays the

Term policy.

All right.

And he'll give us notificat:

You'll have to give us the policy.

24

Defendant will continue to obtain for the

25

plaintiff a new Toyota automobile at wholesale cost, ar

1

that's wholesale to the dealer, not to the retailer to the

2

public, as long as that privilege is provided to him.

3

J

4

we get the benefit of his benefits.

5
6

That means that she'll pay for the wholesale price, but

The parties agree that if the defendant in
J

any way, shape or form ever returns to an interest in the

7

Toyota dealership that's involved in this lawsuit, that

8

she'll automatically be awarded one-half interest.

9
10

No alimony to either party.
J

11

will, within 60 days or sooner place a new roof on the
duplex at 1935-37 East 1700 South, at his cost and expense

12

|

13

I

14

through his workers,
THE COURT:

MR. HORNE:

16

MR. LIAPIS:

18

At his cost and expense?

So plaintiff will pay?

15

17

The defendant

to the plaintiff.

No, defendant will pay.
Defendant will pay at no cost

Total cost to the defendant.

If there are any additional claims for

19

attorneys' fees from this action by plaintiff against

20

defendant, she will assume and pay the balance.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

What do you mean?

Each party

pay their own fees and costs?
MR. LIAPIS:

After the transfer of those

cash sums we referred to earlier.
THE COURT:

So each of you pay their own

1

fees and costs?

2

MR. LIAPIS:

3
4

THE COURT:

7

Then you can decide between yc

and the clients who gets it.

5
6

Right.

MR. LIAPIS:

The parties will each assume

and pay the debts and obligations against their respecti
properties that they are receiving, as well as any debts

8

which they have incurred in their own name since the

9

filing.

10

Defendant will further hold us harmless frc

11

any tax obligations that result from prior joint filing

12

of tax returns, which I think ended with what, 1981?

13
14

MRS. HORNE:

1982 but you haven't actually

filed but you are going to file that as a joint return?

15

MR. HORNE:

For 1982 I guess we still can.

16

THE COURT:

There f s no filing at this point.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Each party will execute necessary documents?
MR. LIAPIS:
MR. HORNE:

Yes.
Do we need to spell out that

exchange, the way we're going to set that up?
MR. CRANDALL:
MR. LIAPIS:
THE COURT:

I don't think so.
We're not through.

The parties are mutually

restrained from picking on each other.
MR. LIAPIS:

Yes.

The defendant will further

8i

1

be awarded all his right, title and interest in and to

2

his business entitled w. R. H o m e ,

3
4

THE COURT:

Incorporated.

Each awarded own checking and

savings account?

5 I

MR. LIAPIS:

Bank accounts.

That's right.

6

Each is awarded own retirement, stock plans, et cetera,

7

if any.

8

St. Mark's?

Don't you have some retirement benefits at

9
10

MRS. HORNE:

I don't think so.

Working

part time, I don't think they provide me with any.

11

MR. LIAPIS:

The plaintiff will be awarded

12

her 1982 Toyota Cressida automobile.

13

defendant are each awarded the furniture in their

14

possession.

15
16

Defendant will be awarded the 30,000 shares
of Challenge Corporation stock, if you still have it.

17

THE COURT:

1

MR. LIAPIS:

19

THE COURT:

8

20
21

Plaintiff and

Defendant awarded?
Yes.
Each awarded own personal

effects, clothing, and all personal property in possessio
MR. LIAPIS:

Also, your Honor, the

22

defendant has requested a further right of refusal on

23

any of the properties awarded to the plaintiff if she

24

should sell, at whatever bona fide offer that she's

25

received on those properties if and when she puts it for

sale or puts them for sale.
A 48-hour time period on that right of
refusal?
THE COURT:

How much?

MR. LIAPIS:
THE COURT:

Forty-eight hours.
That's not reasonable.

MR. LIAPIS:

Sure it is.

No one is going

to give you an earnest money for more than two or three
days, at best.
THE COURT:

But if you hit it on a Friday,

then you ought to have ten days.
MR. LIAPIS:

No one is going to stay on

an earnest money agreement for ten days.

They're going

give you an offer and expect you to counter it.
MR. CRANDALL:
probably right.

Well, yes.

I think that's

Over the weekend we would probably need

seven days.
THE COURT:

We'll be off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]
MR. CRANDALL:

We want three business days

but we'll exclude the condo.
MR. LIAPIS:

Is that all right?

MRS. HORNE:

Yes.

MR. LIAPIS:

Is that all right with you,

three business days?

1

1

'

MRS. HORNE:

Yes

2

|

MR. LIAPIS:

Your Honor, on the attorneys1

fees, we may want to spell thai: out
THE COURT:
5

You are required to be

reasonable

6

I

7

MR. CRANDALL:

We have it now that each

party bears their own attorneys' fees.

A large part of

8

I

this cash settlement is for attorneys' fees, and I may

9

I

want to examine that from a tax standpoint and change that.!

10

We may want to make it payable as alimony.

11

MR. LIAPIS: No.

12

MR. HORNE:

13

|

The $ 5 , 0 0 0

MR. L I A P I S :

MR. CRANDALL:

15

MR. LIAPIS:

16

MR. CRANDALL:
fees and costs?

18
19

$25,000 of it is.
$20,000 is.

So $20,000 of it is attorneys'

I think that's the way it was

intended,
THE COURT:

And it's not denominated as

alimony, so —

22

MR. CRANDALL: No.

23

MR. LIAPIS:

24
25

The $5,000 is hers.

Is that the way it is?

MR. LIAPIS:

20
21

alimony.

No.

14

17

is

No.

So that's it.

Do you

want to ask them if they agree to that?
THE COURT:

Is that as you understand it?

11

1

MR. CRANDALL:

2

MR. HORNE:

3

been read

4

Yes, your

Honor.

You've h e a r d e v e r y t h i n g

i n t o the record,

the

have you?

MR. HORNE:

J u s t a s l o n g a s I g e t my s^

6

THE COURT:

Do you understand it?

7

MR. HORNE:

Yes, I do.

8

THE COURT:

And you agree to be bound

10

MR. HORNE:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

Mrs. H o m e , you have heard v«

5

9

12

I

agree

thereby?

been read into the record?

13

MRS. HORNE:

14

THE COURT:

15

MRS. HORNE:

16

THE COURT:

17

MRS. HORNE:

18

THE COURT:

19

Yes.
And you understand it?
Yes.
You agree to be bound thereby
Yes.
I will approve the

stipulation of settlement.

Will you draft it?

20

MR. LIAPIS:

21

[Whereupon, at the hour of 3:32 p.m., the

22
23
24
25

Yes.

proceedings were concluded.]
-ooOoo-

Thank you, your Honor.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY; AUGUST 8, 1984; 2:00 P.M.
-ooOooTHE COURT:

This is the time and place set

for the hearing of the various motions in the matter of
Dawn W. H o m e v. W. Reid H o m e , D-80-668.

May we have

your appearances for the record, please.
MR. LIAPIS:

Your Honor, Paul Liapis and

Arnold Richer, Grank Gustin and Kent Kasting with regard
to plaintiff, Dawn W. H o m e .
Mr. Gustin appearing

Also, Mr. Kasting and

—

THE COURT:

Why did you leave Mr. Adams out?

MR. LIAPIS:

I'm sorry.

Also Mr. Adams.

The latter three, Mr. Adams, Gustin and Mr. Kasting, are
also appearing in regards to the motion and notice of
hearing filed by Douglas B. Wade.
MR. CRANDALL:

Richard Crandall for the

defendant, your Honor.
MR. WADE:

Douglas B. Wade for Dawn H o m e ,

the plaintiff.
THE COURT:

I suppose the logical order of

business would be to proceed on Mr. Wade's motion.
MR. LIAPIS:

Well, I'm not —

whatever the

Court chooses, and it's your pleasure, but it would seem
that Mr. Wade, not having been present at the time of
trial, the first day of trial and the second day of trial

2

1 ]

when the matter was stipulated to and the negotations were

2

I

had, may not be able to add anything to the merits of that

3

J

motion if we are substituted, and that's my own concern

4
5

with regards to the plaintiff not being properly
I

6

represented or appropriately represented because he wasn't
present to know what happened or what went on.

7

|

8

I

why he ought to run you out of town on a rail, and then

9

I

we'll take it from there

10

I

11

I

THE COURT:

MR. GUSTIN:

Let's hear his motion to see

I would like to be sure that

we have filed a motion to dismiss his motion to substitute |

12

counsel, and to know whether that got into the file or

13

not.

14

motion to be admitted as substitute counsel should not be

15

allowed.

16

something the Court would want to entertain first before

17

we get to his motion.

There were two or three grounds that we have that thej

And from a procedural aspect, that might be

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. LIAPIS:

20

MR. GUSTIN:

22

j

23

'

25

\

It isn't in the file.
A courtesy copy was supposedly j

delivered to you this morning, your Honor

21

24

j

Have you got an extra copy,

Paul?
THE COURT:
MR. LIAPIS:

I'll send the clerk to go look
I have a copy of the motion

no, I don't have a copy of that.

—

Counsel for the defendant]

1

2

I

3

|

4

'

has one, your Honor.
MR. GUSTIN:

Would the Court desire to hear

that motion to dismiss first?
THE COURT:

5

MR. WADE:

Any objection to that?
Let's proceed and handle the

issue
MR. GUSTIN:
8

I

THE COURT:

9

10

MR. GUSTIN:
I

motion to dismiss

W e 1 1 1 proceed, your Honor.
You may do so.
There are two bases to our

the motioti thatfe been filed by Mr. Wade.

11

The first motion is that it f s violative of the statute,

12

Section 78-51-34, which provides the attorneys in any

13

action or special pleading may be changed at any time

14

before judgment or final determination as follows:

15
16

Upon his own consent or upon order of the
court.

17

I
!

Now, it is our theory, your Honor, that this I

18

matter has been finally determined by the court, that

19

the stipulation that was entered on June 20th on the minute

20

entry that was made in accordance with the party stipulatio M

21

on the record, constituted a final determination of this

22

matter.

23

replaced when there has been a final determination of the

24

matter.

25

And that under the statute an attorney cannot be

It's only before there has been a final

!

1

determination of the matter, and that as a consequence his

2

motion to substitute counsel at this point in time is

3

contrary to the statute.

4

With reference to that, we are talking about

5

when a judgment is rendered or when is the final rendition ,

6

of a judgment.

7 I

wife section of the Utah Code the last legislative section,i

8

Section 30-3-5, the words, "when a decree is made," has

9

been s t r i c k e n .

10

There has been a change in the husband and !

I

The word "made" Jl3&Jafig&n»SiJU^

"when a decree of divorce i s rendered" has been —w^j^ffsubstituted)
sac ~i$s8st»am.'z*j * 4

11

as p a r t of the amendment of tlaat s t a t u t e * •*«
I

12 I

Mill Mil

"***•*•

I have not been able to find any Utah cases

13 I

with reference to |^|3ffi^^ffl|^^^S

But in Words and

14

Phrases is tne indication that "as a judgment is pronounced

15

in open court, it is rendered, and j&e~GX&&J?an

enter it

in the minutes any time during the 5^$siqii^f court."
17

And they draw a distinction between^whgn ^a^^dg^oat^is •*, * i

18

entered and when it is entered of record.

19

the Court that by the change in the statute, I believe the

20

legislature is getting to the point where it is a judgment

21

which is being rendered when it is pronounced by the Court,]

22

whether it's reduced to writing and signed at that time/*

2

notwithstanding.

3

24
25

And I submit to

And I submit to ^ ^ ^ O T T C H ! ^

of the situation here, the motion to substitute counsel
I

has to be done before judgment or final determination,

.

1

There has been a final determination of this

2

matter on June the 20th, and now the motion filed is a

3

Johnny-come-lately motion.

It's out of order.

It's not

in conformance with the statute and it should be dismissed.
5

I

6
7

The second basis of our motion to dismiss
is that the motion that's been filed here is slanderous,

I

8

untrue, and should be stricken in accordance with Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

9

The relevant portion

of that rule states, your Honor, that "The slanderous or

10

indecent matter can be stricken."

11

context it is stated in the rule, the signature of any

12

attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he's read

13

the pleadings and that, to the best of his knowledge,

14

information, and belief, there is good ground to support

15

I

And I read it in the

it and that it is not interposed for delay.

16

If a pleading is not signed —

17

with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be

18

stricken as sham and faulty, and the action may proceed

19

as though the pleading had not been filed.

or is signed

20

|

21

I

attorney might be subjected to appropriate disciplinary

22

I

action.

23

I

indecent matter is inserted.

24
25

For a willful violation of this rule an

Similar action may be taken if scandalous or

your Honor

The motion that's been filed,

—
THE COURT:

How would I know that without an

1

and it's found in 55 Pacific Reporter at page 74, an 1898 j

2

case.

3
4
5
6

In that case a matter had been substantially
completed and one of the parties moved to substitute
their attorney.

The issue was should the court allow such

a substitution.

The holding of the case is to the effect

that the court cannot be used as an instrument of fraud to
8

do out a person's fee that he's justly entitled to.

9

it states from Mecham in that regard:

And

"The client, however;

10

will not be permitted to discharge his attorney without

11

cause unless he first pays or secures the attorneys' fees

12

and charges, and the court will not enforce substutition

13

unless that has been done."

14

Now, on that point, your Honor, I call your

15

attention to the stipulation that was entered into by the

16

parties as it relates and is set forth in the transcript.

17

On page 11 of the transcript Mr. Crandall indicates that

18

each party is to bear their own attorneys1 fees and says,

19

"A large part of this cash settlement is for attorneys'

20

fees.

21

change that.

I may want to examine that from a tax standpoint and|
We may want to make it payable as alimony.

22

"MR. LIAPIS:

23

"MR. HORNE:

24
25

"MR. LIAPIS:

No.
The $5,000 is alimony.
No.

"MR. CRANDALL:

$25,000 of it is.

1

evidentiary hearing on the

2

MR. GUSTIN:

—
He has accused the whole firm

3

of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis of sexual harrassment.

4

I'm here in behalf of myself today, Mr. John Adams on

5

behalf of himself, Mr. Kent Kasting on behalf of himself,

6

and the other members of the firm would be here if they

7

could, but we don't even know this lady.

8

on its face t h e

9

scandalous.

I'm saying that

motion that's been filed is

It is indecent and it's scandalous and it

10

does not speak the truth on its face.

11

it should be dismissed and taken as if it had not been

12

filed at all.

13

And for that purpose)

Now, there is one other third ground for our

14

motion.

15

right at the tail end here in terms of what the law is,

16 J

and that is with reference to the protection of an attorney)

17

who has appeared in the matter and who has earned their

18

just fruits in terms of attorney's fee.

19

that I think, your Honor, this is the reason that this

20

motion is filed by Mr. Wade, is none other than to avoid

21 I

the just responsibility of paying an attorney's fee.

22

That is not stated in our motion, but it comes

I want to say

I cite to the Court in this connection an

23 J

old case, but it has been shephardized and there is an

24

ALR notation that speaks to the same subject matter, and

25

it is Sandburg v. Victor Gold & Silver Mining Company,

1

|

2 ]
3

$20,000 i s .

|

is

So $20,000 of it is attorneys}1

"MR. CRANDALL:
fees and costs.

I

6

Is that the way it is?

MR. LIAPIS:

I think that's the way it was

"THE COURT:

And it is not denominated as

intended

7

8

alimony and -

9

"MR. CRANDALL:

10 j
11

»MR. LIAPIS:

No

No.

So that's it.

Do you

want to ask them if they agree to that?

12 I

"THE COURT:

13

"MR. CRANDALL:

14

The $ 5 , 0 0 0

hers

4
5

"MR. L I A P I S :

j

15

"THE COURT:

Is that as you understand it?
Y e s , your Honor

Mr. H o m e , you've heard

everything that's been read into the record, have you?

1

6 j

"MR. HORNE:

Just as long as I get my sword, j

18

"THE COURT:

Do you understand it?

19

"MR. HORNE:

Y e s , I do.

20

"THE COURT:

And you agree to be bound

17

I agree.

27

thereby:

22

I

, "MR. HORNE:

23

I

"THE COURT:

24

I

been read into the record?

25

I

"MRS. HORNE:

Yes

Mrs. Home, you've heard what's

Yes

"THE COURT:

And you u n d e r s t a n d

"MRS. HORNE:

it?

Yes.

"THE COURT:

Do you agree to be bound

thereby?
"MRS. HORNE:

Yes.

"THE COURT:

The Court will approve the

stipulation of settlement.
8

|

Will you draft it?

"MR. LIAPIS:

9

Yes.

Thank you, your Honor."

Now, not only are we third-party beneficiariej:

10

of this agreement, but it goes right to the essence of the

11

case that I cited to the Court.

12

do us out of a justly earned fee, which is contrary to

13

Utah law.

14

Utah statute.

15

see what's being attempted in this matter.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The attempt here is to

And the whole procedure here is contrary to the
I urge the Court to see the impropriety to

THE COURT:
questions, Mr. Gustin.

Thank you.

Let me just ask you a couple of

We met at least informally, as I

recall, or I don't know whether we met or had a conference
call, but I recall further conversation —
parties were here —

I think the

at which Mr. Liapis suggested that

there was no meeting of the minds and there was a
misunderstanding and, therefore, we didn't have a final
determination as you urged earlier.
MR. GUSTIN:

I don't know what that

conversation was about, but after reviewing the transcript,

10

1

I think there was some uncertainty as to what the

2

transcript said and didn't say, and I think that's what

3

really everybody has been waiting to have the hearing

4

about today, to see what the agreement was,

5

THE COURT:

But the statements of Mr. Liapis

6

were that he understood it to be one thing and

7

Mr. Crandail and his client said they understand it to

8

be another thing.

9

If that's the case and the Court backs off

10

and relieves them from their so-called understanding, then

11

do you really have a determination under the statute you

12

are urging upon the Court?

13

MR. GUSTIN:

I don't suppose we would at

14

that point, your Honor, if that's the holding of the Court,

15

However, I think the Court would have to take such steps

16

as were necessary to protect us on the fees that have

17

I

been earned to this point.

18
19
20

THE COURT:

Why does the court protect you

MR. GUSTIN:

In allowing substitution of

on fees?

21 j

counsel, and I assume that that's without good cause and

22 I

it's a sham pleading

23 I

—

THE COURT:

Don't you still have authority

24 J

under statute to file your attorney's lien and serve it

25

on M r . Crandail and he'll tell Mr. H o m e , "You better hold

11

that $20,000 and let those crazy people go and fight about
it.
MR. GUSTIN:

Well, I think the Court has

to go a little bit further so that the court is not being
used as an instrument of fraud.
THE COURT:

But what have you lost by your

firm being let out if you can immediately file an
attorneys' lien and they know that they have notice by
the attorney's lien that you file a claim against all
proceeds and awards out of the judgment —

out of the

divorce decree?
MR. GUSTIN:

I suppose what we have lost

is the delay in collecting that money.

Now, it's my

understanding that money has been deposited by Mr. H o m e
with Mr. Crandall.

There has been substantial performance

of this agreement, even on the day it was entered, on the
20th.

So to unroll all of those things so that everybody

is put back in their same position, and Mrs. H o m e goes
back to where she was on space one, rather than getting
the benefits that she has ostensibly received, and
Mr. H o m e goes back to space one, we would go back to
space one and file our lien and probably be adequately
protected at that point.
But if the situation is allowed where the
client gets the benefit of the bargain, and then for some

12

1

reason gets out of that portion of the obligation which is

2

just as much a portion of the obligation as any of them,

3

then with respect to attorneys' fees we are dealt with

4

unjustly.

5

Thank you.
THE COURT:

You're ostensibly in a position

6

of conflict, aren't you, arguingenforceability on one hand

7

and that Mrs. H o m e ' s express intention for being here is

8

to try and get out from under the effects of what the other)

9

side thinks is --

10

MR. GUSTIN:

I don't know what position

11

she's going to take today, but I think Mr. Liapis has

12

another part of the argument here as to the entry of the

13

decree as first prepared, nunc pro tunc, which would give

14

the parties what they bargained for on the 20th day of

15

June.

16 J

I suppose.

He will address that issue at the appropriate tir^e,

17

MR. LIAPIS:

Your Honor, in that regard,

18

may I respond to the concern you have with regard to the

19

statement I made and the argument in chambers?

20

know if you want to do that before Mr. Wade or after

21 I

Mr. Wade.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. LIAPIS:

Go ahead.

I don't

Proceed.

Rich, you can correct me if

24 J

I'm wrong on this.

When we delivered the draft of the

25

findings, conclusions and decree and the order to

13

Mr. Crandall the first time around, he sent them back two
weeks later and major changes were made, and we tendered
our version of those to you, then Mr. Crandall then
tendered his version to you, and we came over at my
insistence and argued it here and had other conversation
in chambers.
The primary purpose for coming over here
was that you either sign their version, rolling over in
essence the old capital gains basis, or you sign our
version giving us the stepped-up basis.
The comment that was made, and I don!t
want it misinterpreted, was that if we do not get the
basis of the stepped-up value on the property, and that's
not the understanding, then we're not in agreement,
because we can't ao back and recoup that if we stand
where we're at.
Mr. Crandall has a similar argument, but
I think the two comments were made independently of and
in a secondary nature, rather than a primary nature.

Our

purpose on that day was to come in here and get the
findings, conclusions and order signed as we had drafted
them and we felt we had bargained for. And I think that
was Mr. Crandall's position also.

But it was your

statement, I believe, that we would definitely need the
transcript, and that we should wait until that transcript

1

1 !

was prepared and see what the transcript said

2
3

Well, now, the transcript is back and,
|

4

of course, that's in our second motion.

But in talking

with Mr, Crandall, I think he would agree that there was
JIBII—T***"'***-

fJJUMJHmkVWIIZ*

* *

5

I

nothing in the transcript that supports their position,

6

'

i.e., it is a rollover basis or anything other than a

7

stepped-up basis, and the position was that at that time
8

on the 20th of June, the law of the landj^as Davis,
•Irian Mniir*-^ - M ^ * - ^ " » - ^ ' .£m*U3mM*.iS.7misram* «E-«Jg5<

9
10

Our testimony in the appraisals that you
|

11

<j. v-

U.J.0.V-.

i i x ^ i i ^ i

I

I

X>V^L^J.^

^

"

«

u y v *. ^ , y y w v y

THE COURT:
.«»

13
14

4

at the higher basis than $825,000 value
I

12

heard and that she testified to show that Townhouse Court

v v^. -i. v-i w •

D i d n ' t i t show a f a i r

market

Wjt.

value?,

MR. LIAPIS:

It showed a fair market value,

15

but that's where we were coming from and that was our

16

position.

17

going to take the lower basis. We wouldn't have bargained

18

for as much as we did — and if you recall, we were asking

19

for another complex, a complex of greater value — and in

20

hindsight as well as at that time it wouldn't make sense

21

for us to retreat when that complex was $1,600,000 and

22

this complex was $825,000.

23

that reduction?

24
25

Of course, we wouldn't do that if we were

On what basis would we take

It had to be there was something in our
position that would warrant that type of a change, and the

15

1

change was the stepped-up basis to give us the depreciated

2

value to shelter the income.

3

way.

4

was here, M r . Thronsen was here, and they were here for a |

5

purpose, and they were consulted.

6

we were negotiating so that all this was explained to

And that's why we went that

And if I may pursue it one step further, Mr. Travis

i

I

They were consulted as i
j
i

7

Mrs. H o m e

8

that was the understanding, and that's why we took the

9

settlement that we took.

over and over again as we were negotiating.

And the primary

Andj

inducement

10

was that stepped-up bas^is so _she could depreciate the

11

$125,000.

12

matter is that, in hindsight, the Tax Reform Act had not

13

been passed by the Senate, only by the House at that point

14

in time.

15

would ever become the law of the land, until after the

16

fact.

Davis was the law of the land.

The fact of the

We had no expectancy or indication that that

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WADE:

Mr. Wade?
I must admit to being in a bit of

19

a difficult position, your Honor.

20

principal issue that we have before u s , that before we

21

can get to the eventual issue of replacing counsel is

22

this matter of whether we have a final judgment or not.

23
24 j

THE COURT:

First of all, the

You clearly don't have a final

judgment.

25
MR. WADE:

Okay.

If we don't have a final

16

1

judgment, then I

—

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. WADE:

I haven't signed anything.
Well, I make my argument on the

4

assumption that we are not going to have a judgment

5

signed as of the 20th of June or prior to the 1984 Tax

6

Reform Act.

7

simply, to the fact that we've had all kinds of defenses

8

raised, one of which was the defense that the charge was

9

against all of the members of the firm.

10

And basically the argument comes down, very

N o , the charge was against the firm.

11

Mr. Liapis being a member of the firm and actions by him

12

being actions of the firm, that's where the charges were

13

being made to.

14

Basically what it all amounts to is that

15

M r s . H o m e , after many, many months of frustration in

16 J

dealing with M r . Liapis, and constantly in consultation

17

with myself with respect to the case and with

18

representation and with my encouragement to her to continue!

19

with the firm because she was so close to the judgment,

20

finally, after the trial and before any judgment had been

21 |

signed, as in fact it has not yet been signed, she came to

22 I

me again and she asked what the law is right now with

23 I

respect to transfers pursuant to a divorce.

24 j

"Well, the last I'd heard, the '84 reform act was eminent. 11

25

And I said,

She called me on the 18th, and the reform act

17

1

was passed on the 18th.

2

found that indeed it had been passed, and I got back with

3

her.

4

could continue to confide in Mr. Liapis or have confidence

5

in Mr. Liapis's representation of her.

6

did considerable research and in fact got back to her,

7

and once again —

8

but I once again told her and recommended to her that she

9

stick with the firm of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis,

I researched it that day and

She was quite concerned again about whether she

At which time I

she's here ready to testify if necessary,

10

again, because she was so close, at which time she called,

11

Liapis and she indicated to Mr. Liapis that the tax

12

setup was essential to her, the step-up in basis, and that
"'^•*M*JE

13

H>
H

*

14
15

l^tS^^^'^o^y

on -the- property xat&er than^make 00£eY. *

16
17

Mr. Liapis told her that the only way that

18

he would go back to a trial and fight the issue wo uld be

19

if she paid the bill that she had just been sent.

20

bill was $35>,000 r your Honor, and there was no way that

21

she could pay that bill.

22

$7,(300 in legal fees and her savings, everything s he owned

23

had just beesn depleted to a point where she could not in

24

any way pay even a substantial part of the $35,,000 bill. 1

•

That

She had already paid the firm

^»<r.->t !*?»-"***-

25

At which time she called me back up and she

18 |

1

said, "They are not going to do it unless I pay them the

2

$35f000.

3

gets back from his vacation."

4

that I had any intention of stepping in on the case and

5

taking it over, and it was just because at that point she •

6

had no choice but to go to somebody who would pursue the

7

matter, as Mr. Liapis had told her that he would not unless]

8

she paid the fee that had just been mailed to her.

Mr. Liapis has insisted I pay him before he

9

And that's the first time

!

I

In our consultations over the course of the -j

10

since last August when we first began discussing the case,

11

she had constantly mentioned several other things, including

12

promises that he ! d made her that he'd never followed

13

through with, his refusal to follow directions that she

14

had given him, and worst of all, she has included in her

15

motion the matter of sexual harrassment.

i
16

And basically, even in spite of all those

j

17

claims, she was so encouraged by the time March came

j

lo*

around and it looked like she was going to have a trial in j

19

April and have it over with, that she continued with the

20

firm with Paul Liapis representing her.

21

and kept on until she finally could no longer continue

j

22

with the firm.

'

I

So she continued

*
f
'

i

23

There is no way, shape or form that this

24

motion to remove counsel is to avoid the attorneys 1 fees

25

to the firm.

[
f
[

She has every intention of paying to them

19

1

their just fees.

2

to her were grossly excessive in light of the contract

3

that she signed with them, but that's another issue

4

altogether.

5

with them until she simply could no longer continue with

6

them.

7

We do argue that the fees that were sent

But the bottom line is that she continued

Now, I would like to make a point with

8

respect to the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR,

9

Section 2-110, with respect to mandatory withdrawal of

10

counsel.

11

"A lawyer representing a client before a

12

tribunal, with its permission, if required by its rules,

13

shall be withdrawn from employment if he is discharged

14

by his client,"

15

The way I read that is that counsel must

16

seek discharge and the judge can refuse to discharge them

17

J

due solely to the fact that it may delay justice, but

18

J

otherwise the judge has the discretion to grant the

19

I

original counsel's request for withdrawal or not, but

20 I

that counsel must request withdrawal from the case when

21 |

discharged by his cli.ent.

22

I don't think has been raised so far today,

23 I
24

25

J

THE COURT:

And that's the one thing that

If they do, if this proceeding

does result in discharge, how do you intend to proceed on
your motions where you weren't a party to the settlement

20

negotiations or discussions?
MR. WADE:

Well, first of all, I've got an

agreement with her and with Arnold Richer to where if I
have a question, he'll help me with the question.
Second of all, I have familiarity with the
case and I have got all or most of the documents.
still have several documents.

They

I have familiarity with the

case, however.
THE COURT:

But the settlement discussions

were oral.
MR. WADE:
THE COURT:

Exactly.
And you weren't a party to any

of those discussions.
MR. WADE:

I was not a part to those

discussions, no, and I want to make this very clear, and

that is, t h a ^ ^ l ^ M ^ e t t J e m ^ i l l r ^

ff;t*

>TB "> i f W J f l f

***,8T

»o n eVMr S :maHBKd r «' sSLd
W*A 'St*taasO!M!k& I

Wwm

Wzpnceriked, *the case^ls*. s e t t l e d because that's.&veryilfeing
^m^^^^M-^^^d^sisaply

r e s t : a^^ftSi^t>61nt,<

Does
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1
2

that answer your question:
j

I THE COURT:

Are you taking the position that

3

if I d o n f t address the basis issue specifically in the

4

findings and decree —

5

property -- what complex is it?

a simple description that the

6

MR. LIAPIS:

7

THE COURT:

Is it Townhouse Apartments]

Townhouse Court.
Townhouse Court is conveyed to

8

her, that by operation of law that means she gets a

9

stepped-up basis?

10

yfc

f

I don f t think it's necessary,

MR. WADE:

11

your Honor, that you make a ruling that she gets a

12

stepped-up basis.

13

be there to show that this was premarital property, and

If the IRS wants to fight, that will

^ " • ^ w * rttum*salk

14

usually under the Davis rule she would get the step up

15

in basis.

16

effective prior to the reform act of 1984

17 j

So as long as the order by the Court is

M R . LIAPIS:

—

Without stepping on Mr. Wade's

18
position, I think that's true and I meant to mention that
19

I

the Townhouse Court was one of those assets acquired

20

prior to the marriage.

We made that clear to the Court

21

when we were discussing it in chambers.

22

and Mr. Richer and Mr.. Crandall came to submit the papers

23

to you, that was one of the points we raised.

24 J

premarital asset.

In fact, when I

It was a

Her name was not on it and Davis would

25
apply.

It's a transfer and Mr. H o m e knew that.

22

Mrs. H o m e knew that.

Everyone knew that,

THE COURT:
MR. LIAPIS:

I didn't know that.
I'm sorry, but I thought we'd

told you that that was the one that had been constructed,
I think, in two phases.
THE COURT:

You told me that when you came

back in trying to get me to enter the order at the midnight
hour, and at that point I indicated we better have a
hearing on what went on in the other room during
negotiations.
MR. CRANDALL: 'L Your Honor, regarding the
trial, I think a lot of misunderstanding is that there
wasnjt. a -dis.cu5.si0n-about stepped-up basis]!} and that's the
first time it came out, was in our findings.

But what was

discussed, in my view, anyway, was avoiding the Davis rule.
The Davis rule is a United States Supreme Court case that
says that if it's a marital division of property, that's
a taxable event.

And that's all that case says.

I think

counsel agree with that.
Subsequent to the Davis case there's been
several Internal Revenue rulings that interpreted ways
around the Davis case, one of which is 80.59, which states
that if it's an attempt to equally divide marital assets,
it is not a taxable event, it is not a Davis case.

And

so we discussed that we were going to avoid Davis.

23

1

The problem is you don't say, "Well, I'm

2

not going to step up the basis or I am going to step up

3

the basis,"

4

Davis.

5

because the tax just disappears into the wind, which is

6

something that the IRS isn't in the habit of letting you

7

do.

That's a natural concomitant of avoiding

You cannot avoid Davis and also step up the basis

8

So if you avoid Davis and it's not a taxable

9

event, then there's no stepped-up basis.

You don't need

10

to spell it out.

11

taxable event, you don't need to take the next step and

12

say, "Well, you can't step up the basis, because that's

13

just a natural —

14

If you're avoiding Davis and it's rot a

flows naturally from avoiding Davis."

In the transcript there is support for our

15

position.

16

the transcript on page 3 Mr. Liapis says that "In addition

1?

the plaintiff will be awarded all right, title and interest

18

I

19
20

We discussed this informally as well, but in

in and to the Townhouse Court Apartment complex, together
with all the appliances and any furniture*"
Let's see, he says, "Appliances, deposits,

21

rentals, the whole thing.

22

as an exchange item to equalize the marital assets of the

23

parties in this matter."

24 J

25

It will be transferred to her

The language of 59 says an equalization of
marital assets, if that's what the decree is, then that

24

avoids Davis.

So I put in the findinqs that this is an

equalization of marital assets, number one, which doesn't
mean whether it's acquired before or after, because if it
was acquired by him before and then he gave her some
interest in it or she acquired some interest, then it
can still be a marital asset.

If the Court finds it's a

marital asset, then that's something we can do battle with
as far as the IRS.
m

If that's in the findings of the Court, whichf

we put this in, and secondly, that this is an attempt to
equally divide marital assets and avoid differences, we
added the additional phrase so there wouldn't be any
confusion regarding the stepped-up basis, which isn't
necessary, but we added it.Jf,
At "that point everything hit the fan. And
that's exactly what happened.

And I think that's the deal.!

Mr. Liapis indicated that there wasn't a meeting of the
minds, and now his position has changed, that there is a
meeting of the minds. £l would suggest there was a meeting
of the minds and we ought to have the —

certainly ought

to not have the decree entered nunc pro tunc, because that
further confuses the issue.

It may look like we're trying
t

to avoid the new law, and I think I'm entitled to a finding
l

that says it's a marital asset and it's transferred and

>

this is an attempt to equalize those marital assets.7
25

MR. LIAPIS:

May I respond?

reading page 3 on lines 21 through 24,
:iiigt:kirg

8if

*a little bit more xnzo

Your Honor, in
^9BmmiiWmBWWmmS^f

tmm?3!«H^

The important language is line 16 through 19

where it says:

"In addition, the plaintiff will be

4

awarded all right, title and interest in and to the
Townhouse complex..." that's where the statement of what
in fact was agreed to was made.
As we go on further, it's my question:
"Is any furniture in it?"
Mrs. H o m e said no, and then we go on to
describe that she gets the appliances, deposits, rentals,
the whole thing —

period.

For him to say that it equalizes marital
assets and for Internal Revenue rule, as he says, 80.59
to apply, it would have to have been said that she and he
jointly own and have jointly acquired an interest in A
B, C, D properties and they each have a half interest in
each of those properties and they each are awarded a half
interest in those properties.
But because it is so difficult to get half
an interest in or a piece of the property to each, we'll
then give her this and we*11 give him these, and that is
what you get.

And we did say, in all fairness to

Mr. Crandall's position, that we would try to minimize
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1

tax consequences —

2

that we would try to avoid Davis, but needless to say, thatj

3

is superfluous because we have a premarital property.

4

Now, one of the positions the Court had

not as Mr. Crandall indicated, but

___

5

indicated all through the trial was that Mr. H o m e brought

6

the nucleus

7

through that nucleus,

8

part of that.

9

was used by counsel in the negotiations.

in and he generated this marital estate

10

and I'm not going to give you any

That was your comment which, of course,

Now, he can't sit and argue both sides of

11

the fence and say, "I want the best of this bite and I

12

want this change over here to exclude him.

17

PMR. CRANDALL:

I disagree with Mr. Liapis.

18

As far as arguing both sides of the fence, Mr. Liapis is

19

doing it now.

20

before, and now he's saying, well, you said yourself it

21

was premarital property.

22

He's arguing that this was marital property

What I'm saying is when you settle it you

|
t

23

can come in and have a finding that we agreed with the

j
l

24

Court and we stipulate that it's marital property, and this)
25
is a joint division of marital property. I
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1

THE COURT:

2

subject.

3

of the case and

I don't know how we got off the

I think w e were talking about kicking Liapis out
—

4

MR. CRANDALL:

5

THE COURT:

That's correct, your Honor.

I was simply inviting your

6

comments as to whether you agreed or disagreed, and here

7

you are stirring the water up.

8
9

MR. CRANDALL:
Honor.

I apologize for that, your

I'll make one comment on that motion and that is,

10

that as a practical matter I'm sure that we can tell that

11

continued representation just won't work.

12

I would take some disagreement, for what it's worth to the

13

Court, and I feel compelled to make a comment that the

14

gross lack of attention to her case and negligence is not

15

consistent with my observation as opposing counsel.

16

THE COURT:

But secondly,

It is not consistent with the

17

Court's observation either.

If you're ever around

18

Mr. "Mapis, he never gives up easily, never.

19

of any case at all, and he's had hundreds of them, where

20

he rolls over.

21

point, and even though he may disagree, he just says,

22

"Tough beans.

23

every stage he's hung in there.

24

a number of motions and he was over here badgering me,

25

calling me on the phone, wanting a motion to bring Crandall

I don't know

And he's very vigorous in presenting his

That's what my client wants."

And so at

And it was before me for
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1

in and extract discovery from him and try to get money fronj

2

the court to assist him in paying for appraisal fees,

3

J

4

And so his representation, once I became acquainted with
it, has been very vigorous, and he has pressed his case

5

I

6

J

consistently and without let-up
And so you are looking at it maybe from the

7

perspective of a tax practitioner but from the perspective

8

of a judge that hears a lot of divorces, he was not sitting)

9

I

on his hands, nor was he being casual about it.

10

I

being very aggressive about it

11

'

MR, WADE:

He was

If the Court please, the source

12

of that particular phrase is not directed to the last

13

six; .cnths of the proceeding, but rather, she contacted

14

Mr. Liapis in March of 1983 and indicated to him that it

15

was paramount that this be finished as soon as possible;

16

I

17 !

November at the latest.

He assured her that it could be

tinished by September and she, except for an interrogatory

18

that had been sent out asking for information that she'd

19

already given Mr. Liapis, then there's nothing —

20

no evidence of him having done anything on this case

21

[

until December of 1983

22 [
23

I

there's

And it is certainly the plaintiff's
viewpoint that there was gross lack of attention to her

24

case.

25

schedule into account, and there was pending and incomplete

We know that you've got to take the court's trial
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discovery involved, and there was a substantial delay
that may not be documented by additional discovery
requests, but I would suspect I might be able to go back
and find notes as to where I put Mr. Crandall on notice
several times that 1 wanted the profit and loss statements,
I wanted certain documents that the court was giving

'

direction that they ought to be produced on a certain time
schedule apart from what might have been documented by
additional formal filed discovery requests.
If the Court please, I might insert here that]
it was my impression that at least as of the last six
months he has been prosecuting the case very vigorously,
and it was based on that and that alone on which I made
my recommendation to Mrs. H o m e on July 19th that she
continue with the firm of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis.
However, since then the relationship has
just simply fallen apart and there's no way that they can
continue to fairly represent her.
THE COURT:

You've got to keep in mind that:

the appraisals, given the property involved, were
several thousand dollars.
said and what

And I think from what you've

I've observed, your client was cash poor

and couldn't advance those-funds.
MR. WADE:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Lawyers, I think, are in the
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1

habit of advancing lots of money for their clients.

2

be that as it may, because of the combination of one thing

3

or another, there weren't those kinds of funds available

«

to

But

~

5

MRS. HORNE:

6

appraisals myself.

7 j

appraisers.

I paid for all of the

My counsel advanced no costs for the

8

MR. WADE:

9

agreement of $75 an hour, and she had

10

MR. GUSTIN:

If the Court please, they had an
—

Before we get into that, since

11

our position at that is just totally not true and the

12

agreement will speak for itself, I have a suggestion:

13

think that from what Counsel has stated here, he's admittec

14

that his motion to substitute counsel is not true.

15

doesn't speak, really, to the facts of the matter, and I

16

would suggest that it be stricken for purposes of this

17

hearing today.

^
1

9

I

He

If Mr. Liapis was to lose his motion today
to have this entered nunc pro tunc, we'll withdraw as

20

attorneys in this action.

21

discussion we had earlier, we would protect ourselves the

22

best way we could some other way on our fee.

23

Then commensurate with the

In that event, we'll withdraw and Mr. Wade

24

can appear and he can file his appropriate motion.

25

think that

But I

the pleadings that have been filed here today
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1

are scandalous, inflammatory, and it should be stricken

2

from this record.

3

file a decent pleading, if we lose our motion, then he f s

4

welcome to have the rest of the case.

5
6
7

THE COURT:

to prove willfulness or malitiousness?
MR. WADE:

THE COURT:
Liapis

MR. WADE:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. WADE :

15

THE COURT:

17

That Gustin, Kastmg, Adams &

—

12

16

We can prove the harrassment underi

federal law and the Civil Rights Act, your Honor.

10
11

Isn't saying someone is guilty

I
of sexual misbeha rior slanderous per se, and don't you havej

8
9

We should proceed, and if he wants to

Only with respect to Mr. Liapis. i
But your motion

—

The motion is to remove the firm, i
I understand.

But you say,

"Conduct of the f.irm,,f do you not?
MR. WADE:

Yes.

Mr. Liapis is a member.

He i

18

represents that f.irm and, therefore, his representation of

19

the firm is conduct of the firm.

20

THE COURT:

Let me invite you to just go <DUt

21

in the hall with Mrs. H o m e and discuss what Mr. Gustin has

22

suggested as an appropriate solution, to let them urge the

23

motion about entry of the order nunc pro tunc.

24
25

MR. WADE:

We are willing to do that.

We 've

already discussed it and that 1s exactly what we are willing
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to do.

If they win the nunc pro tunc, then we have

accomplished everything we wanted.

If they lose the

nunc pro tunc, then that's when we want to step in.
THE COURT:

Is that agreeable, Mrs. H o m e ?

MRS. HORNE:

Yes, it is.

MR. CRANDALL:

I don't want to get in a

position where a ruling in favor of the nunc pro tunc is
going to resolve an otherwise sticky problem.

I think

that's unfair to me because I don't think they're entitled
to a nunc pro tunc order.
THE COURT:

We haven't got that far yet.

MR. CRANDALL:

I just want to make sure that

I'm not getting myself into that position.
THE COURT:

Why are you?

MR. CRANDALL:
basis of bargaining —

I just don't think that the

I believe that this is a situation

that we want to get resolved, and what ought to happen is
that I think the Court ought to make a ruling based on the
merits of that, and then Mr. Liapis's firm ought to be
relieved of the furthe responsibility of going forward in
the case, and in essence I suggest that Mr. Gustin's
suggestion is a good one.
I don't think we ought to have this kind of
pleading in the file, but at the same time I don't want
that contingent upon a ruling in favor of the nunc pro tunc
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1

motion.

In other w o r d s , they ought not to be a package

2

sort of situation.

3

5

s S S I C 9 ^ R 1 : ^Xt f s not a package d e a L . ^ M e ^

*>line 7f I didn't go out of my office during

flBnriCPIP^^^^

6

your negotiations, and there's one thing that bothers me

7

a little bit.

8

had their accountants or appraisers at hand and conferred

9

with them throughout, which I didn't specifically observe.

Mr. Richer and Mr. Liapis will indicate they

10

I recall at one point one of them came in and sat in, and

11

I don't know if he was an appraiser or CPA or what the

12

circumstances w e r e , but if they were witnesses or parties i

13

to what the conversations were in terms of your

14

understanding of the settlement agreement, I'm wondering

15

if you're even prepared to go ahead on that motion.

16

MR. LIAPIS:

;

;

Well, your Honor, referring to j

17

Mr. Travis, and I think he was the person who did the

18

evaluations on H o m e Construction Company, off tne top of

19

my head —

20

qualifications.

21

person who sat in.

22
23
24
25

well, maybe Mr. Richer can speak to his
He valued the business and he was the

THE COURT:

I'm simply asking as to whether

or not he was a party to the negotiations.
MR. LIAPIS:
Mr. Crandall and myself.

No.

Everything was done by

We used Mr. Thronsen and
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1

Mr. Travis was here when we were explaining —

2

would come back from our negotiations and I would

3

represent to Mrs. H o m e what was said.

4

and Mr. Travis were there, and Arnie was there, and we

5

would discuss and interpret what was coming from the

6

other side and what was being agreed upon.

7

we took Mr. Travis into chambers, to make sure that when

8

we read into the record the agreement that it would comportj

9

to what we had agreed to.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

when I

And Mr. Thronsen

And that's why

And that's how they were used,

your Honor.
MR. CRANDALL:

They were not party to any

discussions with me.
MR. WADE:

I would like to make one comment.

As I see it, my role here would no longer be essential
to the discussion between them.

The comment that I would

like to make is that Mrs. H o m e has indicated to me that
counsel for defendant, Mr. Crandall, made the statement
after the settlement that Mr. H o m e would have to pay
capital gains tax on that transfer.
MR. CRANDALL:

That is untrue and I deny

that and would do so under oath.
MR. WADE:

If I may be dismissed to have a

seat and observe.
THE COURT:

You may.

Let r s hear your motion

then in terms of entry.

35

MR. LIAPIS:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. GUSTIN:

Has the pleading that's been

filed already been stricken?
THE COURT:

I'm holding that in abeyance

and we'll move on to the next step.
MR. LIAPIS:

Your Honor, the rest of the

motion was our motion to compel

entry of the findings

that were filed and is a follow-up to the motion that
Mr. Crandall and I have verbally agreed to have within
your chambers, Mr. Richer being present.

That was for

the purpose of entering the findings, conclusions, and
the order as we have prepared them and submitted them to
you in July, about the 15th or 16th of July, if my memory
serves me correctly.
Mr. Crandall submitted, also, his copies,
as I understand it, and then we came to court and after
discussion he indicated that the transcript should be
obtained.

Everyone was advised we couldn't have this

hearing until after the 5th of August and then Mr. Crandall
evidently set up this hearing with Mr. Richer1s help in
my absence, and" the purpose was to determine what the
agreement was.
We now have the transcript, and nowhere in
here does it say that we'll avoid Davis.

Nowhere in here

does it establish those bases as Mr. Crandallfs findings
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have set out.
Now, some of this has been referred to and
I don't want to be repetitious, so if you don't want to
hear it, let me know*

But when we negotiated this

aqreement and read it into the record, it was with the
understanding that the value along with the stepped-up
basis, the depreciation and the sheltering of the income,
based on other items, the $160,000 note, the two duplexes,
and the home be awarded to her, along with the furniture
and so forth.
Now, that was a change in the position we
had advocated to the Court in asking for approximately
2.4 to 2.6 million dollars of assets, of real property,
one being the 1.6 million dollar complex as indicated to
you before.

It would make no sense for us to back away

from that type of a demand without some reason.

The reason

being sheltering of the income, the stepped-up basis, and
the fact that she would be the entrapreneur she wanted to
be.

Davis was the case at hand and the law of the land,

and everybody knew that and everyone knew this was a
premarital asset.
I think that one of the exhibits that's
been received was a summary sheet of Mrs. Home, clearly
indicating the dates that those things were constructed,
namely, one-half in 1961 and one-half in 1968.

The parties
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1
2
3
4

were married, I think, in 1969 or 1970.
That was clear on its face, and the evidence
before the Court was that this was a situation -- in fact,
Mr. Crandall's cross-examination clearly pointed out that

5

it was a premarital asset that he brought in.

6

was in cross-examination of Mrs. H o m e .

7

Now, this

For us to take that, with the Davis case beinjg

8

the law of the land, can only indicate that there would be

9

a tax consequence to everybody.

We clearly read it into

10

the record in some of the discussions we had, and in going

11

through this transcript there are two places in the

12

transcript where taxes are mentioned, one being the earlierj

13

discission we had on the attorneys' fees which Mr. Gustin

14

quoted, and the second one where taxes were discussed,

15

about Mr. H o m e holding her harmless from any joint filing

16

that occurred, the last filing being 1981.

17

Clearly, we discussed the award to her of

18

Townhouse Court, the deposits, rentals, and appliances.

19

If there was any indication that there was to be something

20

different with regard to 'capital gains, it should have been|

21

stated in the record.^ It wasn f t stated in the record, and

22
23
24
25

the reason why is because that wasn't the intent.

We

knew and they knew that they would have to pick up the
tax consequences.
As I indicated to Mr. Crandall, it was
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either that you pay the amount of the tax consequences or
a greater sum of money, or you pay the government.

They

•%fi •gpj*

* » W •«*•£, «^jg5

chose the gQvermnent and so we took less for that, and
we relied upon that.

Then they came out and they gave us

a $5,000 check that they were supposed to do, and Mrs. Hornje
has assumed the running and the maintenance and the repair
and the putting new people in Townhouse Court, because
there were vacancies.

They have performed and they knew

what was happening.
Maybe just something else here.

When we

left this courtroom, within days of that decision
Mr. Cra.xdall had our proposed findings and conclusions and
decree.

Two weeks later he was able to respond and I took

a look at them, we made some minor changes that he
requested, and then we submitted those papers.

It was

only during that last two-week period that this trouble
started to arise and those differences and disecrepancies
came in.

And it was after Mr. Crandall said he needed

additional time to research the tax law and determine how
to do what we were trying to do, i.e., minimize the taxes,
not avoid them.

There's no way you could avoid capital

gains on Townhouse Court, because it was premarital.
They knew it and we knew it. That's why we didn't ask for
Townhouse Court.
We were asking for Townhouse Villa, and we
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1

'

2

I

were asking for

—

THE COURT:

Which was also worth more money?

MR. LIAPIS:

More money, and that was the

basis for the consideration for us stepping down, and
5
6

why would we come down?
I

I mean, if you had gone into

chambers and you had flat out told us, "Ifra going to make

7

an award and that's all you're going to get, and Ifm

8

ready to rule," then we might back away.

9

J

ruling.

There was no such

The case was only in its second day, and we had

10

blocked out four days of trial for this case.

11

only heard Mrs. Horne, and no one else.

12 I

have been one or two smaller witnesses who we called.

13

stand and then we had Mr. Thronsen and Mr. Travis to
I

16
17

Well, there may

Mr. H o m e was next scheduled to take the

14
15

You had

come forth.
Why would we back away?

I

our position to take something less?

Why would we reduce
Now, we had

18 [

estimated the estatewas $6 million or more. Why would we

19

take a million eight and take that type of a settlement

I

20

on an estate of $6 million or more?

21

in the value of H o m e Construction Company, and how much

22

of that was really premarital and how much wasn't, and

23

I

how much more you give us.

The difference was

But the marital estate

24

acquired was between six and eight million dollars, as we

25

figured it, and there's got to be some consideration for
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1
2

us taking the lower figure, and it had to be that,
I

coupled with the fact that it was a premarital asset
belonging to M^^ito&£kfe^_-^^C^img^^f.^SL tfrSfftfl,
Everyone knew about it, and now what is happening is that
Mr

• Hornedo-^

capital gain.
7

I

There's no way

anyone can avoid it.

8
9

There's no way out of it.

One of the reasons we're asking for this
I

finding to be nunc pro tunc is the state of the law with

10

regard to the nunc pro tunc.

11

been able to do, 24Am .7nr\2d under divorce and separation,

12 I

Section 425, basically provides that as a general rule

1

the Court has the power, in fact the duty, to amend the

14

record of a judgment so that the record will speak the

15

truth as to what was adjudged and rendered as judgment

3 J

16

|

17

I

18

'

The research that we've

in the cause.
And that applies in actions for divorce
and separation.

The decree of divorce actually having

19

been rendered on a certain day, and that was approved in

20

court or in your chambers and read into the record and

21

everybody agreed to it.

22

|

23

I

THE COURT:

But such date —
Have you got the Pr,eece v

Preece case from our Utah Supreme Court, which says that

24

you can't do it nunc pro tunc except to change clerical

25

errors?

41

MR. LIAPIS:
your Honor.

Ifm not aware of that case,

We might have to take a look at that. You

have got one extremely complicated factor here, and it
goes right to the heart of what we're saying.

If the

decree is somehow signed, say you take ours and you sign
it today without a nunc pro tunc basis, the law of the
land is different from what it was when we bargained.
f The law of the land now says that there's
no such consequences imposed by the U. S. Supreme Court
in Davis.

So your signature would go on the decree now

which is somethina that, number one. was not anticipated,
it was not discussed, it was not the law of the land.

And

it would be giving Mr. Crandall a back door approach to
~~

nMtk

t ***** ^ ~ v*

' **'

^

******

the position he wants now, but something he never
....i.«T*n**^

-

~-J«I *

bargained for, nor was it discussed

You cannot sign it

and give it the validity that was intended without
nunc pro tuncing it back to the date^ripr to the, entry
of the law, and the law was signed by Pres.
18th of July.

Rea

9pfl° n

tlie

That was the last day he could have signed

it before it would have gone ...into,..effect automatically.
So the nunc pro tunc would in fact speak the
truth as to what was intended.
Now, there is an ALR citation, 19ALR3d,
gage 6 52 which indicates that the primary purpose or
function of the entry of decree, of divorce nunc pro tunc
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11

is to correct the record of the decree so as to make it

2

i

speak the truth.

3

J

entry of such a decree is that the divorce decree has

4
5

That is, the ordinary ground justifying

actually been made and rendered previously and the
I

successful parties are entitled to such a decree, but

6

entry of the decree may be omitted or through negligence

7

or mistake the decree otherwise not been properly entered.

8

Now, what we have here is a situation that

9
10

really fits that.
I

We are sitting here arguing over the

language and that's all we are arguing over, because the

11

agreement is clear as set out in the transcript, and that's)

12

really what I was trying to indicate to the Court.

13

We had our agreement, we read it into the

14

record.

15

for the transcript.

16

complicated because it's not the law of the land any more.

17

Now ve have come from the 2 0th of June to the 8th of

18

August, and it has to be nunc pro tunc back to either the

19

day of the trial or anywhere prior to the 18th.

20

ask that the decree be signed as of the date of trial to

21

comform to the record, to comform to the minute entry, to

22

conform to the order this Court made based upon the

23

agreement of parties.

24
25

The agreement is there, and that's why you called
The transcript is clear.

But it's

We would

There's two things that counsel at our table
have indicated, and I'm sure the Court's aware, but
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1

number one, this was one of the matters you

bifurcated .

2

in the decree which was entered in January.

January 24th.

3

Secondly, with our reformatting the differences, the

4

parties had an option of choosing or not choosing the

5

consequences, and I wish I had the language.

6

the parties can choose is to have this effective after

7

or can choose to have it before, and I think that that is

8

a point that ought to be in the Court's mind.

9

The option

But of primarv importance is, what did the

10

parties bargain for?

11

agreement that was read into the record?

12

basis for that agreement and what was given up or

13

received by both parties.

14

What did she receive by the
What was the

And if the Court would consider those things,

15

I think that you will see that we would not have bargained

16

for less.

17

J

As the Court indicated prior, and thank you

tor that, we don't back away from situations when we think

18

our client is right.

19

is entitled to.

20

and we knew what we bargained for.

21

on the stepped-up basis, and we knew what it would do to

22

shelter the income.

23

would have testified to was the effect that that would

24

have on that stepped-up basis, the sheltering of the

25

income is what she should do.

We go for what we think our client

We did that very thing in this matter
W e knew that right off

In fact, one of the items M r . Travis

One of the concerns we had
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1

was that a certain sum of money would be generated to her

2

in addition to the $2,000 per month from this note f and

3

that would allow her the ability to not only be an

4

entrepreneur, but would give her the ability to make

5

additional investments somewhere down the road.

6

was explained to her and that was the premise that we went

7

into this negotiation on.

8

unless we understood that was the consequences.

9

THE COURT:

10

And that

And we wouldn't have done that

Mr. Crandall?

MR. CRANDALL:

Your Honor, I think it's

11

largely irrelevant to speculate on what Mr. Liapis would

12

have done and wouldn't have done or why they didn't do

13

something as a misunderstanding amongst themselves.

14

I postulate that the reason they settled

15

for less is that the first day of evidence didn't go as

16

well as they expected.

17 J

otner than the tax ramifications as to why they changed

18

their deal when we came down to the negotiations.

19

I

There would be a lot of reasons

There

could have been many things in their mind besides tax

20

reasons, and it's an irrelevant consideration as to what

21

the agreement was and what did happen, and I think the

22

Court is aware of this.

23

There was a concern expressed from the

24 I

outset of this case as to the tax ramifications to

25

Mr. H o m e .

The status of the law was Davis, that is, thesej
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1 !

transfers of property would be taxable events to Mr. Home
if some precautions weren't taken.

3

Mr. Liapis has

^ k n o ^ d g e d both today and,jLn jt^Jie«in««w&Jiad.A-«Mjpla-|
of weeks ago when this transcript was ordered.that there

5

I

was an agreement ordered minimizing tax impact.

'

Now, the difference as I see it was the

7

'

agreement to minimize the tax aspect to Mr. Home, and

8

I

Mr. Liapis says it was to minimize the tax impact to the

9

I

parties.

There is no dispute, both from Mr. Liapis a,
-» 4KVJ.MK

10

from myself that the bottom line is there was an agreement
"*

11

- t&~ i(i-M

~~

> J T » - ^ * * *" ***

*

* * * '*<**n_ *,** •.»*.„,

to minimize the tax impact.

i in -rr

"—nrr— H I H I

n im—ii.i.uiLrtwrw •irMMlH— r -Tl M > a B * a y , * C T t i m '* > 1

I suggest to the Court that
St*. ^ ^ f t W W t

12

definitely through the natural concern of my client,

13

the tax ramifications were largely on his part and we wer

14

the ones pushing for that concession.

15
16

* In looking into Davis we determined there
was a way around Davis, and in fact this was raised by
«w «•*? war* *

rflKOVffffia*

a^^^ns

«»&B**! a 1 1 ^

17

the other counsel when they said that it would be difficult]
18

making these transfers because of Davis. We said that
19
20

there are ways around Davis, that we had researched that
before this settlement agreement was made, contrary to

21

Mr. Liapis!s suggestion, and we were aware of the language

22

that could be contained in the findings that would help

23

us in that regard.

-FT

....

g H ^ l W

24

.

.
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-

*
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••mi—ff.anih.*-'

And that is that it's a joint marital
it I

•«>

I

a

|

property and it's an equal division of such.

And that

25

avoids Davis.
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1

We prepared for that and we said okay, we'll

2

cooperate in putting that language in the findings.

3

Mr. Liapis suggests that we took a long time on the decree.

4

In about ten days he prepared the findings and I contacted

5

Mr. Richer and I think Mr. Richer will verify this, and

6

said, "How are the findings coming?"

7

gone through several drafts, that Paul had the final word.

He said they had

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WBS_
I indicated this in conversation with Mr. Richer, since
Mr. Richer wasn't sure what this meant in terms of the
tax language or at least thought it might have been a trust)
agreement or something like that.

1

Perhaps Mr. Liapis and the Court will

2

recall the Court's opening questions when he said, "Well,

3

last week you were in here arguing that there was no

4

meeting of the minds. 11

5

I

Now he's arguing that there is, and I think

6

that at the very bottom —

7

meeting of the minds.

8

to minimize the tax impact, and the parties are here

9

J

the very bottom —

there is no J

There is an agreement that it was

i
I

saying, y e s , it is supposed to be the stepped-up basis,

10

and, n o , it is not the stepped-up basis.

11

specific as to how we were going to minimize that tax

12

impact, because in my view there was only one way.

There is nothing i

There'd
i

13

I

no partial step-up basis or any of that sort of situation, i
i

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

\

Mr. Liapis says he didn't understand it
that way.

But there was no question, both out of my mouth j

and the mouth of Mr. Liapis, that thexa wa« an agreement
to minimize tax: impact.

Now the parties are sitting here

without help from any records as to how are we going to
do that.
I think the Court cannot enter a decree
nunc pro tunc to avoid the new tax law on the basis of tha
record and those statements.

If it can't enter the decree

23
as it is formed now, this date, even Mr. Liapis's own
24
decree, although we do have some minor exceptions to that,
25
aside from taxes, then it can enter none.
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THE COURT:

Do you want to try the whole

thing over again?
MR. CRANDALL:

I don't, but Ifm just saying

that I am certainly opposed to allowing Mr. H o m e to
suffer the tax gains on the entire basis right now.

The

reason again, and I might add, the reason why we are
concerned about it, we don't have an opportunity to tax
plan.

It's just wham, it's everything and we get taxed

the whole bundle right now.
Mrs. H o m e has an opportunity to do some
tax planning, because other than the depreciation aspect,
the taxable gain doesn't come to her, if ever, until she
sdxls the property, and she can structure an installment
sale or an exchange to avoid taxes all together.
MR. LIAPIS:

Well, it would be long-term

capital gain versus ordinary income.
MR. CRANDALL:

Well, that's right, but the

long-term capital gains would be all payable this year.
We have made calculations and we are prepared to testify
that it might result in a $220,000 tax liability to him.
MR. LIAPIS:

I was trying to recall the

language with regard to the tax reformatting and the
transfer, and Mr. Wade has a booklet on the Tax Reform Act
of 1964 which indicates that:
"The property transfer changes are effective
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1

for all transfers after the date of enactment.

I

the transfer is made under an instrument in effect on or

However, jjj

3

before the date of enactment, the new law _does not_^apply

4

unless both spouses or former spouses elect to make the

5

nontaxable treatment apply.

6

by a joint election, can elect nonrecognition treatment

7

for all transfers made after December 31, 1983."

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

My point is, that the real reason there's a
need for the nunc pro tunc is to conform to what they
bargained for, what they settled for, and I'm sure, as I
indicated before, we would not recommend settlement to our
client if something was not appropriate.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

There had to

be some reason for us to back away from our original demand,
and to be awarded

15
16

In addition, both spouses,

—

THE COURT:

The other reason is that I

called both of you into chambers after two days of trial
and indicated that premarital property went with the
original owner under the Preston case, together with its
appreciation, and that concept of appreciation under the
set of facts in this case was kind of a hodgepodge and
would be difficult to unwind and unsnarl and figure out,
didn't I?

Isn't that what I basically said?

That may hav^

been some additional impetus or reason for you to settle
the case.
MR. LIAPIS:

One other thing, your Honor, I
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1

would like to get to.

2

taxes are excessive and there has been minimal impact on

3

us.

4

be structured like that, and we discussed that, your Honor.

5

She is not in any position to afford a $10,000 a year

6

loss.

7

and she hasn't the assets to secure it.

But we have $10,000 loss per year if it continues to

8
9

Let's assume that his capital gains

She hasn't the capital, she hasn't the cash flow,

Now, why would we have bargained for that
tyP e of

situation?

10

THE COURT:

The loss is a non-cash loss.

11

MR. WADE:

It's a cash loss, your Honor.

12

MRS. HORNE:

It's a cash loss.

13

MR. RICHER:

You can't take the depreciation.

14

MR. WADE:

15

MR. LIAPIS:

That is a cash loss.
As a result of not having a

16 I

stepped-up basis for the depreciation and sheltering, and

17

tl it's why Mr. Elliott Travis was here and explained that.

18

We were discussing it.

19

MR. WADE:

If I may make just one statement.

20

If the capital gains would be $224,000 at a 50 per cent

21

tax bracket, which is maximum, that would make it.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. WADE:

24 J

THE COURT:

25

That's not what I said.
That is what he said.
Well, the property was $1,625,000)

and if you fully depreciated your

—
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1

MR. CRANDALL:

There are three pieces of

2

property we're talking about here.

3

about Townhouse Court, we're talking about a piece of land,

4

we're talking about

5

—

THE COURT:

6

We're not just talking

What is the depreciated basis?

That's what we're talking about, is Townhouse Court.

7

MR. LIAPIS:

8

THE COURT:

9

It's two twenty.
So deducting two twenty from

eighty, you've got $600,000.

10

So you've got a long-term

capital gain of $600,000; is that about right?

11

M R S . HORNE:

12

THE COURT:

13 J

MR. LIAPIS:

We can't count the land.
I understand that.
We're talking about eight twenty)

14

five less two twenty, and computing that on 40 per cent

15 I

of ordinary income —

16 I

of about a 20 per cent consequence, your Honor.

17

think i t f s as great as what they're saying.

18

or 60 per cent, you get a breakdown

THE COURT:

19

That's what I was trying to get

through, to figure out.

20

MR. CRANDALL:

21

We're talking also about a

piece of property that was given on 13th East.

22

|

our overall settlement calculation.

23

I

property there.

24

I

25

I don't

THE COURT:

That was

That's a zero basis

The basis, including the land,

is $220,000.
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1

MR. CRANDALL:

2

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. HORNE:

Somewhere near $24,000.

3

How much is the basis of

the land?

4

5

On Townhouse?

It's

depreciated about 50 per cent.

6

THE COURT:

You have got a $625,000 gain?

7

MR. HORNE:

Yes.

8

MR. LIAPIS:

9

There was one other point, and

now all of a sudden we're hearing for the first time that

10

we have the 6715 South property that we have got to

11

depreciate or that we have got to take the capital gains.

12

We've never heard that before.

13

I wovCd argue at this point that what we are doing now is

14

seeing an expansion of what —

15

say this, you are hearing a new issue at this point.

16 J

after the fact.

17

suuden we've got it now.

18

the credibility of this argument.

19

That's never been raised^

you might say —

how can I
It's

They knew about it then and all of a
I think that takes away from

MR. CRANDALL:

It's not our finding.

We

20

don't have anything in your findings.

21

put it is on Townhouse, which is what we asked for in

22

the stipulation or settlement.

23 |

it is impossible to speculate the reasons why Mrs. H o m e

24

did one thing or another, why she agreed on one deal or

25

another.

The only place we
I

The second thing, again,

My only response to that is that your position
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1

is that we wanted the tax benefit because we felt we were

2

giving her more than we needed to anyway.

3

THE COURT:

The Court's order will be that

4

I'll enter the findings, conclusion and decree without

5

regard to any tax language at all, sj.mj?ly a division of the;

6

assets nunc pro tunc to J_une__20_, 1984.

7

MR. LIAPIS:

Thank you.

8

MR. GUSTIN:

We'll strike the pleading that

9

was filed?

10
11

THE COURT:
stricken?

12
13

MR. WADE:

No objection.

It probably hasn't

even landed in the court's file.

14
15

Do you object to its being

THE COURT:

Any objection to me turning over

the original?

16

MR. WADE:

17

MR. CRANDALL:

No.
In terms of time for appeal,

18

if you enter a nunc pro tunc order I might be out of time

19

on appeal.

20

30 days from today —

21

don't know how that works.

I would request the right to have an additiona]|
from that order to appeal it.

I

Maybe this order is the one

22

THE COURT:

23

the bottom of the order.

24

date you get it in your machine, so get it in there and

25

get that added.

—

There should be a provision on
It is signed August, or whatever

Nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984.

The
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1 !
2
3

common law marriage by operation of law, because one of
J

4
5

the early experiences I had as a judge was that I had a
decree and findings submitted for Judge Crockett for 1941.

J

6
7

Preece case says we can't nunc pro tunc, which has created

And I've only been here for five years, so that's the
oldest one I've seen.

J

8

But I've seen some that are very,

very old, two and three years.

In the Preece case the

court said we can't do it and there's got to be a lot of

9

I

bigamy going on out there if that's good law.

10

I

what the Supreme Court says.

11

I

12

|

But that's

However, that case involves a widow rather
than a divorced wife.

That statute has been amended that

* •

k. <—

13

says if good cause is shown that —

well, I was looking

14

for it and it isn't in the supplement.
15

It was the last

legislature.

16

So you ought to find that.
17
18

There ought to

be % specific finding that I think there is good cause
shown that I enter the order without regard to the tax

19

:QUsequences as it was indicated on the record, and if it

20

had been timely submitted, whatever the tax law was, I

21

wasn't clearly informed what it was, I didn't know what

22

it was, and I'm still not sure I understand what it is.

23

MR. CRANDALL:

I take it then that the

24

Court would not entertain the language of this being an

25

order to transfer joint marital property to equalize the
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marital estate which is indicated in the transcript?
THE COURT:

No.

I think I just put language

in there of what the particular assets are that are
transferred.
MR. CRANDALL:

But Mr. Liapis's statement

was that it would be transferred to her as an exchange
equalizing the marital assets of the parties in this
matter.
THE COURT:

I don't think that was intended

as a term of art, particularly.
MR. LIAPIS:
findings —

All we have done in the

I'm only asking this for guidance —

we

basically said that plaintiff should be awarded the
following parcel of property, and then in subparagraph 4
we defined Townhouse Court

1.1 acres and so forth, and

indicated that plaintiff will assume the mortgage payment,
the taxes, the mortgage balance of approximately two
ninety-eight, pay the property taxes, that they would
transfer all reserves.
I would urge that we ought to leave that
language as it is, since it doesn't say anything about
a valuation, a basis or

—

THE COURT:

I don't want any language in

there on basis or stepped-up basis or
MR. LIAPIS:

—

I'm saying that we do< not have
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1

any such language.

2

here, he could take a quick gander at it.

3

there's anything that needs to be changed.

4

So I think that since Mr. Crandall is

MR. CRANDALL:

I don't think

There are a number of smaller

5

items, such as the repairs on one of the air conditioners,

6

but I would like the opportunity and I would like to take

7

a quick gander, given the posture of this case, and I

8

would like at least the opportunity to approve as to form

9

some of these smaller items that we disagree on and that

10

are not before the Court today.

11

MR. LIAPIS:

I don't want to foreclose him

12

on that.

13

major items that we have drafted in paragraph A - 4 , there's

14

nothing in it by way of basis, there's nothing by way of

15

value, and I think there's nothing wrong with the language

16

in i t , in accordance with your ruling.

17

have anything particular, we'll let that stand and go on

18

to deal with other things.

I'm just trying to say that with respect to the

19

THE COURT:

And unless you

The Court doesn't strike any

20

values on any of the property.

21

to be valued,

None were really intended

1

Mr. Crandall for approval as to form.

2

MR. LIAPIS:

3

THE COURT:

Thank you.
And I think that because of the

4

nunc pro tunc feature, if you'll come in I'll as least

5

find the Preece case and find the statutory reference.

6

The Preece case says that we can't nunc pro tunc.

7

statute is subsequent to this divorce involved, and

8

Justice Stewart articulated that we did have a statute and

9

the Supreme Court ought to be practical about it and not

10

do as they did.

11
12

The

But at least I can give you the reference
on that case.

13

MR. LIAPIS:

14

THE COURT:

All right.
So there ought to be a finding

15

added that J find that under the circumstances I had no

16

intention or didn't conclude one way or another on the

17

record what the tax effects were or weren't, and it was

18

entered on that basis, the tax law being what it was, and

19

the order ought to be entered effective as of that date.

20

21
22
23

MR. LIAPIS:

Thank you, your Honor.

[Whereupon, at the hour of 3:40 p.m., the
proceedings were concluded.]
-ooOoo-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOooDAWN W. HORNE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.
W. REID HORNE,

Civil No. D 80-668

Defendant.

Judge Rigtrup
ooOoo

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th
and 20th days of June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant,
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement
having been read into the record in the presence of Plaintiff and

Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings,
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc and the Court having reviewed the
records and files herein and being fully advised in the premises,
and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, attorneys
for Plaintiff, does now make, adopt and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months
immediately prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint in this
matter.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having

been married on January 17, 1970, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and
having separated in May of 1981.
3.

No children have been born as issue of this marriage,

and none are expected.
4.

The Court finds that the parties have entered into a

verbal stipulation and property settlement agreement, which was
read into the record in the presence of all parties, concerning
the division of the property of the parties, payment of eianntarn
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and debts and other related matters, which the Court now finds to
be fair and equitable:
A.

Plaintiff should be awarded the following parcels

of real property:
(1)

The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East

4181 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and
separate property, free and clear of any interest of
the Defendant.

Plaintiff should assume and pay the

mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments
thereon.
(2)

The duplex located at 1923-25 Ecst 1700

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any interest of the
Defendant, together with all appliances, furniture and
fixtures situated therein and all income received
therefrom.

Plaintiff should assume and pay the

mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments
thereon.
(3)

The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any interest of the
Defendant, together with all income, appliances,
furniture and fixtures situated therein.

Plaintiff

should assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and
insurance payments thereon.

3

(4)

The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing

1.18 acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, together with all fixtures, appliances,
current and prepaid rentals, deposits, ledger books,
financial records, the reserve and escrow accounts,
i£i?ii.idarfrg—Ufam m w uf 02/647.73 leprcaiii Ling frha mnnin^
n*"""!^
-or*. ¥hr
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a,fffftimnti.n<j irmi^Hil "Plaiirt'if f' S Enhibife ]>•,—attached

atp^umnln i ^ y », i i»rM .Mrmnry

i"*; 1ftfl1 r and otner items

directlv associated with this property.

Plaintiff

should assume and pay the only mortgage payment upon
this property to Prudential Federal Savings as of July,
1984, with a balance of approximately $297,000.00, and
should assume and pay the property taxes for the year
1984.

Plaintiff should hold the Defendant harmless

from the mortgage as of July 1, 1984, and all property
tax obligations for the year 1984.

Defendant should be

responsible for &*£* payments on the mortgage for the

A*
months prior to July 1, 1984, including,
limt-mrii t f i j

' 1 u i - M my . mF?" " j

ai H I j ' j j j i l ' . l . l , W I N ,

late

c h a r g e s ^ The t r a n s f e r of t h i s p r o p e r t y should be
A ine f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1984 # arwi t h e above l a t a cfaaarga.B an*
c m ^ i w lunJb uhoulifl be p a i d by that- Hftfra,
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(5)

The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located

at 6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and
clear of any encumbrances thereon.

Plaintiff should

assume and pay the property taxes for the year 1984
P

Slid <~\m DiifmidanL should *-*•-**<**nw *in p 1fnntiff Piny^a*"
rtamyivfefl rndc may hana Loon established for this
properfeyy but DefmiLLmL iLpieacMLa no w c h accountc-'or
rpsi»i inib •UJIJH;*'

l

Bl^g*Guun-^ "Initiii that no mortgage or

other obligation presently exists on such property.
B.

Defendant should be awarded the following parcels

of real property:
(1)

The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644

South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34
acre, with a mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in
the approximate present balance of $53,300.00, together
with all fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits,
reserves and other such associated assets therein.
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
and other debts against said property and hold the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(2)

The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt

Lake City, Utah, with no mortgage obligation existing
against the same, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.

5

Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(3)

The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located

at 3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
containing 2.64 acres of land, with a mortgage balance
to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately
$504,709.74, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.

Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(4)

The Townhouse II apartment complex located at

2250 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a
mortgage balance to Prudential Federal Savings of
approximately $922,687.00, the same being a limited
partnership with W. Reid H o m e and David H o m e in which
the Defendant owns 57.5% interest, together with all of
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits,
reserves and other associated assets therein.
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
and other debts against said property and hold the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(5)

The office warehouse complex located at 547

West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately

6

$199,918.00, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.

Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(6)

The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison

Street, Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.

Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against -said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(7)

Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St.

George, Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and
paying any taxes or other obligations owing thereon and
holding the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(8)

Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time

Share interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay
any debts and obligations outstanding and owing against
said interest and to hold the Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
(9)

The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839

Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all
of the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits,
reserves and other associated assets therein.
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
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and other debts against said property and hold the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
C.

Plaintiff should further be awarded the contract

receivable for $160,000.00, together with all interest due
and owing tnereon, and the monthly payments of approximately
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's
recent sale of the property located at 4400 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Defendant should cause the

conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest

m

and to said contract and contract receivable with said
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984.
D.

Defendant should be awarded as his sole and

separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and
appliances presently in his possession and under his
control, his bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000
shares of Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal
effects and belongings, including his grandfather's sword.
E.

Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and

separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures
and appliances presently in her possession and under her
control, the 1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank
accounts and savings accounts and other such accounts, and
her personal effects and belongings.
F.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded

any alimony from the other.

8

G,

Defendant should be ordered and required to secure

and maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00
term life insurance policy on his life, with the Plaintiff
as owner and with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and
exclusive beneficiary thereon.

Defendant should forthwith

obtain said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said
policy to her and make all premium payments thereon.
H.

Plaintiff should be required to assume and pay and

hold the Defendant harmless therefrom the following
obligations:

The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse

Court Apartments to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage
payment on Plaintiff's condominium to Prudential Federal
Savings, the mortgage payment on the two duplexes awarded
Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and Loan, the property
taxes on the above condominium, duplexes, Townhouse Court
and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and any debts she has incurred in her own
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter *-trw r*W***w2-/
I.

Defendant should be required to assume and pay and

hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following
obligations:

All debts and obligations incurred by the

parties during the course of the marriage/, all debts
associated with those real properties awarded to the
Defendant, all obligations that may result from joint tax
return filings of the parties, and any debts and obligations
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he has incurred in his own name since the filing of the
Complaint in this matter,
J.

Tim C a m L fiiMJfr fhit thn

Plaintiff is employed as

a registered nurse with St. Mark's Hospital and hao -on
inrrmna ot b c N e e w g7£fl«0n ami ?8Q.Q».Q0 net peg moiMih and aAoo
has rental income from her two duplexes.
K.

^

C u m L Iimlu thafe-fche Defendant is

MRself-employed t»y W^R.frfrj Con&truciioi'i Company;"is ila
majority—&4<?»gfrholdar} and has rental income from the various
apartment complexes referred to above.
L.

Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff,

and has done so in open Court, the sum of $5,000.00, the
f4 P..

5MVKown

same to include the June «anpdNgt payment due under the
Temporary Order.
M.

Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff on

or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of $15,000.00
and an additional sum of $5,000.00 in six (6) months or on
or before the 21st day of December, 1984,
ic anr 1 r mmfaCM • Any.i a d d i t i o n a l f e e s ^
PlaiuLifI'J attorneyfc fooj
*•£•

incurred by either of the parties, sihrjuid be1
j$t&*^X&,r\\\

N.

i

JTTJ

L

ir li

\\

Defendant should cooperate in obtaining a Toyota

automobile or automobiles for Plaintiff at the dealer*s
wholesale price through the automobile dealerships owned by
Larry H. Miller.

Xt»tt C u m t finds that Plaintiff should have
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the privilege of purchasing new automobiles at the dealer's
wholesale price for as long a period of time as Defendant
has this privilege^! Tha 'usmw* iinds that teho dollar
p *irhr1 rfirn 1 in prira ir nnt 1 hn t1 p n nr nffrrarl t~n the jttt>*1
pMhl i/\—but is-rafehor tehe dealer 'c factory
0.

cost,

ThiD Court fmrthci findafrhiit4hould Defendant ever

obtain any ownership or proprietary interest in any of the
entities that Defendant sold to Larry H. Miller in November
of 1981, then Plaintiff should automatically be awarded
one-half of the Defendant's acquired interest.
i/R*
K
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Motorg i Ltd . ,—Laniinen^ LbtqgUHj , L i m i t c d y and Ldiiy-~miA»r

P.

Defendant s h o u l d be o r d e r e d t o r e p l a c e t h e roof on

t h e duplex a t 1933-37 E a s t 1700 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y ,
a t h i s s o l e c o s t and e x p e n s e .

Utah,

Said work i s t o be done by

t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s work crew and a t t h e s o l e c o s t of t h e
Defendant and i s t o be completed w i t h i n s i x t y
t h e s i g n i n g of t h i s
Q.

(60) days of

order.

The p a r t i e s s h o u l d each be m u t u a l l y e n j o i n e d and

r e s t r a i n e d from h a r a s s i n g , a n n o y i n g , b o t h e r i n g or harming
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one another in any way and at any time, with the sole
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties,
payment of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary
by this order.
R.

Defendant should be awarded all right, title and

interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company,
together with all assets and liabilities associated
therewith, with the same to be free and clear of any
interest of the Plaintiff.
S.

Defendant should further be granted a right of

first refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the
above properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium,
awarded to her for sale, with said right to be exercised i
writing within three (3) business days of receipt of the
offer of purchase from the Plaintiff's prospective buyers.
T.

The parties should each be ordered to do and

perform all the matters and things required by each of tnerr
to be done herein, and they should effectuate and carry
forth the agreement expressed herein.
U.

The parties further agree that all property,

assets and other items which have been acquired during this
marriage have been fully declared and distributed by this
Agreement and that no other assets or properties exist.

12

5.

The Court finds that with the recent unexpected change

in the tax laws that good cause exists to grant Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984.

The court further

finds that the Defendant was given proper notice of such Motion.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The verbal stipulation and property settlement

agreement presented to the Court and more fully reflected in the
foregoing Findings of Fact, concerning division of the property
of the parties, payment of support, payment of the debts and
obligations of the parties, and other matters, as more
specifically set forth above, should be ratified, approved and
confirmed in all particulars, and the same is to be embodied into
the Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property, Payment
of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters to
be entered herein.
2.

It is hereby ordered that the final judgment of divorce

which has this day been signed by the Court be filed and entered
Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as of June 20, 1984, that being the
date when the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and
entered.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That judgment be entered accordingly.
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DATED this tff -"day of August, 1984
BY THE COURT

^EN^ETH RIGTRl
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

-&^Ll

^'<-i-n

By
RICHARD K. CRANDALL
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was handdelivered to Richard K. Crandall, Esq., 10 Exchange Place, 11th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah

84110, this /£> "day of August,

1984.
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AUG 17 1984

PAUL H. LIAPIS
ARNOLD RICHER
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 532-6996

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION OF
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY,
PAYMENT OF DEBTS, SUPPORT,
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER
RELATED MATTERS

DAWN W. HORNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
W. REID HORNE,

Civil No. D 80-668

Defendant.

Judge Rigtrup
ooOoo

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th
and 20th days cf June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant,
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement
having been read into the record in the "presence of Plaintiff and

Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings,
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc, and the Court having made and
entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer of
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for Plaintiff:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
as follows:
1.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the following

parcels of real property:
A.

The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East 4181

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any interest of the Defendant.
Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the mortgage,
property taxes and insurance payments thereon.
B.

The duplex located at 1923-25 East 1700 South,

Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property,
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein
and all income received therefrom.

2

Plaintiff is ordered to

assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and insurance
payments thereon.
C.

The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700 South,

Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property,
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein
and all income received therefrom.

Plaintiff is ordered to

assume and pay all mortgage, property taxes and insurance
payments thereon.
D.

The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing 1.18

acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
together with all fixtures, appliances, current and prepaid
rentals, deposits, ledger books, financial records, the
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items directly associated with this property.

Plaintiff is

ordered to assume and pay the only mortgage payment against
said property to Prudential Federal Savings on said
property, commencing July, 1984, with a balance of
approximately $297,000.00, and shall assume and pay the
property taxes for the year 1984.
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Defendant shall be

responsible for -sttL payments on the mortgage for the months
p r i o r to July, 1984, including, but not Aimifcod le», the May,
t9 8 2 and KpirSlrr-T&to, l a t e charges.T The t r a n s f e r of t h i s #*~
property shall be effective
ghar

July 1, 1984 f and ..t-hc pibjwo
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The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located at

6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and clear
of any encumbrances thereon.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume

£e <
and pay the property taxes for the year 1984, and nAiic
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2.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded the following

els of real property:
A.

The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644 South

800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34 acre, with a
mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in the approximate
present balance of $53,300.00, together with all fixtures
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other such
associated assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume

and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
B.

The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt Lake

City, Utah, with no moitgage obligation existing against the
same, together with all of the fixtures and appliances,
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rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets
therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
C.

The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located at

3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing 2.64
acres of land, with a mortgage balance to Prudential Federal
Savings of approximately $504,709,74, together with all of
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and
other associated assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to

assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
D.

The Townhouse II apartment complex located at 2250

South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately
$922,687.00, the same being a limited partnership with W.
Reid Home and David Hcrne in which the Defendant owns 57.5%
interest, together with all of the fixtures and appliances,
rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets
therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
E.

The office warehouse complex located at 547 West

3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage balance to
Prudential Federal Savings of approximately $199,918.00,
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together with all of the fixtures and appliances, rentals,
deposits, reserves and other associated assets therein.
Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
and other debts against said property and hold the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
F.

The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison Street,

Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated
assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom*
G.

Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St. George,

Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and paying any taxes
or other obligations cwing thereon and holding the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
H.

Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time Share

interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay any debts and
obligations outstanding and owing against said interest.
I.

The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839

Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all of
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and
other associated assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to

assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
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3.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the contract

receivable for $160,000,00, together with all interest due and
owing thereon, and the monthly payments of approximately
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's recent
sale of the property located at 4400 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah.

Defendant be and he is further ordered to cause

the conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest in
and to said contract and contract receivable, with said
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984.
4.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and
appliances presently in his possession and under his control, his
bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000 shares of
Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal effects and
belongings, including his grandfather's sword.
5.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and
appliances presently in her possession and under her control, the
1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank accounts and savings
accounts, and her personal effects and belongings.
6.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant is awarded any alimony

from the other.
7.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to secure and

maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00 term life
insurance policy on his life, with the Plaintiff as owner and

7

with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and exclusive
beneficiary thereon.

Defendant is ordered to forthwith obtain

said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said policy to her
and make all premium payments thereon.
8.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to assume and

hold Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations:
The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse Court Apartments to
Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment on Plaintiff 1 s
condominium to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment
on the two duplexes awarded Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and
Loan, the property taxes on the above condominium, duplexes,
Townhouse Court and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and anv debts she has incurred in her own
name since the filing of the Complaint in this m a t t e r ^ m fycKf^fUi 2
9.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume and

hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations:

All

debts and obligations incurred by the parties durina the course
of the marriage/, all debts associated with those real properties
awarded to the Defendant, all obligations that may result from
joint tax return filings of the parties, and any debts and
obligations he has incurred in his own name since the filing cf
the Complaint in this matter.
10.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to

Plaintiff on or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of
$15,000.00 and an additional sum of $5,000.00 in six (6) months
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or on or before the 21st day of Decemberf 1984,
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13.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to replace the

roof on the duplex at 1933-37 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, at his sole cost and expense.

Said work is to be done by

the Defendant's work crew and at the sole cost of the Defendant
and is to be completed within sixty

(60) days from the signing of

this order.
14.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded all right, title

and interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company,
together with all assets and liabilities associated therewith,
with the same to be free and clear of any interest of the
Plaintiff.
15.

Defendant be and he is hereby granted a right of first

refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the above
properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium, awarded to her
for sale, with said right to be exercised in writing within three
(3) business days of receipt of the offer of purchase from the
Plaintiff's prospective buyers.
16.

The parties be and they are each hereby restrained and

enjoined from harassing, annoying, bothering, or otherwise
harming one another in any way and at any time, with the sole
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties, payment
of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary by this
order.
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17.

The verbal stipulation and property settlement

agreement of the parties is hereby approved and confirmed in all
particulars.
18.

It is hereby ordered that this Order of Distribution of

Real and Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's
Fees and Other Related Matters which has this day been signed by
the Court be filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as
of June 20, 1984, that being the date when the judgment was
rendered herein.
19.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do

and perform all the matters and things required by each of them
to be done herein.
DATED AND SIGNED this

f7 --a ay of August, 1984 and to be

filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984 that being
the day the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and
entered.
BY/THE' COURT:

vENNETTH RIGTRUP
Distr/ict Court J*udge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

H. D I X O N Hi-vr ..=?.V
Bv

RICHARD K. CRANDALL
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Dawn W. Home,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
W. Reid Home,

Case No. 860060-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme.

BILLINGS, Judge:

FILED
MAY1R19R7
Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeate

Defendant appeals from the trial court's entry nunc pro
tunc of an order distributing property incident to a previously
granted divorce. We reverse the district court.
The parties were divorced on January 27, 1984. The divorce
action was bifurcated with the four day property division trial
to begin on June 19, 1984. On the second day of the trial,
June 20, 1984, the parties entered into an oral property
settlement agreement on the record. The record reflects the
property was to be transferred in order "to equalize the
marital assets of the parties."
The court approved the agreement and requested plaintiffs
counsel to prepare an order reflecting the oral stipulation.
Defendant's counsel objected to the prepared order as it did
not indicate the transfer was to "equalize the marital assets,"
language which was determinative as to the tax consequences of
the agreement. The court therefore set a hearing on August 8,
1984 to consider the dispute over the tax language.
The dispute over the terms of the agreement is best
understood with reference to federal tax law. Prior to July
18, 1984, taxation of marital property settlements depended on
the terms of the court's order or the parties' agreement. In
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), the United States
Supreme Court held that a transfer of marital property incident

-w ^>>.vr^ww nQo o Daxe or excnange, and thus a taxable event*
Ifi7~a€~71. Thifi^irapfligfiiLjupDn the tx*nsfeirina_jparty tax
liability for capital gains on the property_up to the_date_of
t£g|[gfer, and provided the recipient party a stepped-up basis
iir-bfee- property IreTTecfTng its value as of the date of the
transfer* £&£ I.R.C. § 1001.
In several revenue rulings after Davis, the Internal
Revenue Service delineated a now well-recognized exception t:o
the Davis rule: if._the__transaction was an attempt to equally
Jivxae marital assets, and this was clearly indicated in the
agreement, thefe~was no taxable event within the meaning of
Davis. S££ Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul.
¥1-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158. The parties^ dispute over the terms
to be included in the order relates to whether the agreement
constituted a tax free equal division of marital assets or a
taxable transfer of property.
While the parties were negotiating over the terms of the
order, President Reagan signed into law the Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369. The Reform Act overruled Davis and
proyiiled^iJia£jriQ gain or loss will be recognizecLtQ the
transferojr in the case qfJj;ranisJLej:s oflprgperty incident tc a
divorce. Further, the Act provided that the basis of the
property transferred will carry over and become the basis of
the property in the hands of the transferee. Tax Reform Act
§ 421 adding I.R.C. § 1041 and amending I.R.C. §§ 1015 and
1239. Thus, for plaintiff to receive a stepped-up basis in the
oropeicy she received as a result of the property settlement
agreement, the order must have been entered prior to the
effective date of the Reform Act, July 18, 1984, and could not
contain language that the transfer was to equalize the marital
assets.
Also in this interim period a dispute arose between
plaintiff and her counsel. Plaintiff alleged, among other
charges of misconduct, that she agreed to the settlement only
upon heT~~counsel* s representation that she would get the
st¥pp<ed-~up "basis and his stipulation in court to the" contrary
was against her instructions.
At the August 8 hearing, the court considered the charges
against plaintiffs counsel, the dispute over the language to
be contained in the proposed order, and whether the order
should be entered pync pro tunc to the date of June 20, 1984.
Plaintifl^claimed that unless she received the stepped-up
basis, the property division was inequitable and unacceptable.
Deleniant contended the parties1 oral stipulation expressly
included language that the agreement was an equal division of
thepa^^s~Tss"ets in or3ef~tnD insure that the transfer of
property Wis not a taxable event. The record supports
defendant*! contention. The district court eliminated any
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reference in the decree to tax consequences'and on August 17,
1984 entered its Order of property division nunc pro tunc to
June 20, 1984.
The effect of the court's ruling was that the transfer of
property was a taxable event because there was no specific
language to the contrary, and the plaintiff received a
stepped-up basis in the property transferred. Plaintiff then
withdrew all charges of misconduct against her counsel. On
appeal defendant alleges the court erred in entering the decree
nunc pro tunc.
I.
The court has the power to act nunc pro tunc—to do an act
upon one date and make it effective as of a prior date.
Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1881); Kettner v.
Snow. 13 Utah 2d 382, 384, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (1962). The common
law power of nunc pro tunc allows the court to correct errors
or supply omissions so the record accurately reflects that
which in fact took place. Kettner, 13 Utah 2d at 384, 375 P.2d
at 30. Recently, the Utah Supreme Court considered the
application of the doctrine of nunc pro tunc in a divorce
action:
A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make the
record speak the truth; it may not be used
to correct the court's failure to speak.
In other words, the function of a nunc pro
tunc order is not to make an order now for
then, but to enter now for then an order
previously made.
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted).
In Preece, the trial court read its findings of fact and
conclusions of law and decree of divorce into the record
following a trial between the parties. The husband's counsel
objected to the attorneys' fees included in the proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law but submitted the
matter to the court for resolution. Prior to the court's
signing of the decree, the husband died of a heart attack. To
prevent the wife from receiving a portion of her husband's
estate, the trial court entered the decree nunc pro tunc as of
the trial date. The supreme court vacated the trial court's
action despite the harsh result.
The Preece court held the entry of the decree nunc pro tunc
was improper because until the decree was signed the trial
court retained the ability to alter its terms, which meant
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there had not been a final resolution of the matter at the date
of the trial. Specifically, the court stated:
The determinative factor which prevents
the use of nunc pro tunc in the instant
case is the lack of signature on a decree
and the attendant ability of the court to
alter the terms of the decree until it was
signed and entered. Additionally, the
dispute over the substantive issue of
attorney fees (in spite of respondent's
counsel's indication that he would leave
its resolution to the trial court) points
to a lack of finality. Because the
judge's oral announcement was not reduced
to a signed written decree prior to the
death of Mr. Preece, a previously made
order did not exist and therefore did not
afford the court the right to employ the
nunc pro tunc device.
However, even if the oral announcement
were considered a previous order, nunc pro
tunc was misapplied here. A nunc pro tunc
order should be the reflection of a
previously made ruling. The court had
orally announced that the decree was "to
become final upon signing." By making it
effective as of the trial date rather than
upon signing, the court altered its
previous ruling. It did not merely
reflect its previous ruling.
Preece, 682 P.2d at 300.
Subsequent to the trial in Preece, the Utah Legislature
enacted a statute committing broad discretion to trial courts
in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations matters:
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its
finding of good cause and giving of such
notice as may be ordered, enter an order
nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to
marriage, divorce, legal separation or
annulment of marriage.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984).
In support of his contention that the court erred in
entering the decree nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984, defendant
argues this statutory provision applies only to marital status
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and not to the property division aspect of'a divorce. Further,
defendant contends that, even if the statutory language is
interpreted to deal with issues beyond marital status, the
statute does not expand the limited use of nunc pro tunc at
common law as delineated in Preece. Finally, defendant claims
that, regardless of whether the statute otherwise applies, the
facts of this case do not constitute ••good cause" for entry of
the court's Order nunc pro tunc.
II.
Defendant argues Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984) is limited
to matters involving marital status. In construing legislative
enactments, we assume that each term in the statute was used
advisedly. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah
1982). This Court therefore interprets and applies the statute
according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably
confused or inoperable. Id.
The nunc pro tunc statute expressly states the court may
••enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage,
divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage.- Utah Code
Ann. § 3Q-4a-l (1984) (emphasis added). By its wording, the
statute applies to any and all matters relating to divorce
proceedings. Had the Legislature intended the statute to be
limited to status, it could have easily so stated.1
Defendant asserts the legislative history of this statute
demonstrates an intent that the statute apply only in cases of
marital status, such as where a decree of divorce is prepared
but not signed and the parties subsequently remarry. The Utah

1. For example, Cal. Civil Code § 4515 (West 1970), prior to
its 1^83 amendment, stated that upon the filing of a final
judgment nunc pro tunc "the parties to such action shall be
deemed to have been restored to the status of single persons as
of the date affixed to such judgment.H Id.(emphasis added).
See In Re Marriage of Frapwell, 53 Cal.App.3d 479, 485, 125
Cal. Rptr. 878, 881 (1975) (where no second marriage was
involved, entry of a divorce decree nunc pro tunc was
inappropriate).
Similarly, the Washington statutory scheme allowing for
entry of final divorce decrees nunc pro tunc contains limiting
language that upon entry of such decree, "the parties to such
action shall be deemed to have been restored to the status of
single persons as of the date affixed to such judgment.- Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.290 (1973) (emphasis added). See Pratt
v. Pratt, 99 Wash. 2d 905, 665 P.2d 400 (1983) (entry of decree
nunc pro tunc proper only when necessary to validate a
subsequent marriage).
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Supreme Court has frequently stated that in construing
legislative enactments, courts must give effect to the
Legislatures underlying intent. See, e.g., Millet v. Clark
Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980),
The legislative history indicates the bill was passed
"because there have been a number of cases of obvious injustice
that could be corrected by the entry of nunc pro tunc decrees
by the court." Tr, of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27,
1983# comments of Rep. Lorin Pace. Representative Pace,
sponsor of the Bill, gave a variety of diverse examples wherein
entry of an order nunc pro tunc might be appropriate including:
where the parties, believing they were divorced/ entered into
subsequent marriages (status); where a death occurred after a
divorce proceeding had been heard but before the order had been
filed (status incident to property division); and where there
was a clerical error in filing the divorce papers (status
and/or property division). I£. The legislative history
includes examples of both status and property division problems
which demonstrate a need for the legislation. Furthermore,
the legislative history reveals an intent to give the courts
broad discretion to enter orders nunc pro tunc in domestic
proceedings where an obvious injustice would otherwise result.
Our review of the statutory language and legislative
history of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984) reveals no intent on
the part of the Legislature to limit the scope of the nunc pro
tunc statute only to cases involving the marital status of the
parties.
III.
Defendant further contends that the statute does not
eliminate the common law requirement of a previously made final
order, as discussed in Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 (Utah
1984). This contention is contradicted by sound principles of
statutory construction and by the legislative history of the
nunc pro tunc act.
Statutes are not to be construed as effecting any change in
the common law beyond that which is clearly indicated.
However, where a statute is in derogation of the common law,
and is also remedial in nature, the remedial application should
be construed so as to give effect to its purpose. Terry v.
Lincscott Hotel Corp., 126 Ariz. 548, 617 P.2d 56, 60 (1980);
see Marsland v. Pang, 701 P.2d 175, 192-93 (Hawaii App. 1985);
Cf. Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1337
(Utah 1982).
A literal reading of § 30-4a-l indicates a legislative
intent to change the standard for entry of nunc pro tunc orders
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in domestic proceedings from requiring a previously
made final order as delineated by common law, to
requiring a finding of ••good cause." As pointed out
by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Preece:
The Legislature has recently enacted a
statute that commits broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc
orders in domestic relations
matters. . . . All that need be shown is
H
good cause."
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
Further, the legislative history reveals the statute was
remedial in nature. The purpose of the statute was described
by Rep. Lorin Pace as follows:
And the reason this bill is before us is
because there have been a number of cases
of obvious injustice that could be
corrected by the entry of nunc pro tunc
decrees by the court . . . .
Tr. of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27, 1983.
Moreover, the examples given by Rep. Pace during the bill's
third reading indicate an intent to overrule the common law
approach to nunc pro tunc orders which was causing "obvious
injustice." Indeed, Rep. Pace made specific reference to the
Preece-type situation where at common law, due to a husband's
death occurring after a divorce proceeding has been heard but
before the order has been entered, a wife is entitled to a
widow's portion of the estate rather than the provisions agreed
to in-the divorce proceeding. Clearly the statute sought to
remedy the injustice caused by the common law approach.2
IV.
Having found that Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984) allows
the granting of nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations
matters upon a finding of "good cause," we now face the
question of whether the trial court's entry of his Order nunc
pro tunc in this case was based upon "good cause."
2. The analysis and holding in Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984) therefore has been statutorily overruled.
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In defining -good cause" for purposes of Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-4a-l (1984), it must be borne in mind that the legislative
history indicates an intention to give the courts wide
discretion to prevent Hobvious injustices.H The meaning of
"good cause" must be determined on a case by case basis, in
light of all of the surrounding circumstances/ as equity and
justice require. See Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407
(Mo. 1963); In Re Estate of Corbett, 203 Neb. 392, 279 N.W.2d
89, 95 (1979). £f. Wrav v. Folsom, 166 F. Supp. 390, 394 (W.D.
Ark. 1958); Dalv v. Dalv, 533 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1975)
(Crockett, J., dissenting in part).
In the case before us, defendant contends there was no
basis for a finding of good cause and thus the entry of the
order nunc pro tunc. The district court expressly found:
The Court finds that with the recent
unexpected change in the tax laws that good
cause exists to grant Plaintiff#s Motion to
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as
of June 20, 1984. The court further finds
that the Defendant was given proper notice of
such Motion.
If the court had entered its order nunc pro tunc to give
effect to the parties' expressed intentions prior to the change
in the tax laws, good cause no doubt would exist. Our review
of the record, however, reveals the contrary. The agreement
reached between the parties on June 20 expressly states: -[The
property] will be transferred to her as an exchange item to
equalize the marital assets of the parties in this matter." In
entering the order prior to the effective date of the Reform
Act, and without the essential and agreed upon tax language,
the court either misunderstood how critical the tax language
was to the parties agreement or substituted its own judgment
for that of the parties, and it misused its nunc pro tunc power
to accomplish that aim. Furthermore, a fair reading of the
record indicates that in reaching its decision, the court
improperly considered plaintiffs offer to drop the misconduct
charges against her counsel in return for entry of the order
nunc pro tunc. Such conduct does not constitute Mgood cause"
for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984).
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Reversed and remanded for entry of the order of property
division effective August 17, 1984. No costs.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-00O00-

Dawn W. Home,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

W. Reid Home,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 860060-CA

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Plaintiff/
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter,
and the Court having duly considered said petition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff/Respondent•s
Petition for Rehearing be denied.
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1987.
FOR THE COURT:

Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court

